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9
PARENTS, BABIES, AND MORE PARENTS
JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN*
The possibility of three parents has arrived. A growing chorus of law 
review articles favors such recognition1, and several states authorize such a 
result either explicitly or through doctrines such as de facto parentage or 
third party visitation statutes.2 The Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell 
v. Hodges,3 which granted same-sex couples the same access to marriage as 
other couples, is likely to accelerate these developments. While Obergefell
does not resolve questions about what the ability to marry means for estab-
lishing parental relationships, it opens the door to further recognition of 
parentage on the basis of factors other than biology. And without the limi-
tation of biology, the courts are increasingly likely to find that more than 
two adults have assumed parental roles. The unresolved legal issue on the 
horizon, for same-sex and different-sex partners becomes: what does it 
mean as a practical matter in custody and child support disputes to say that 
a child has three legal parents?
The number of jurisdictions recognizing three parents is increasing, 
albeit without full resolution of the implications. The American Law Insti-
* June Carbone is the Robina Chair of Law, Science and Technology, University of Minnesota Law 
School. Naomi Cahn is the Harold H. Greene Chair, George Washington University Law School. We 
thank Kathy Baker, Courtney Joslin, and Jeff Parness for their support.
1. See, e.g., Laura N. Althouse, Three’s Company? How American Law Can Recognize a Third 
Social Parent in Same-Sex Headed Families, 19 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 171 (2008); Nancy E. Dowd, 
Multiple Parents/Multiple Fathers, 9 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 231 (2007); Melanie B. Jacobs, Why Just 
Two? Disaggregating Traditional Parental Rights and Responsibilities to Recognize Multiple Parents,
9 J. L. & FAM. STUD. 309, 312 (2007) [hereinafter Jacobs, Why Just Two?]. Professor Brian Bix has 
rebuked conservative commentators who respond to the possibility of multiple parenthood with “bo-
geyman” arguments such as “[o]nce” we cross the border into legalized multiple parenthood, we have 
virtually arrived at the abolition of marriage and the family.” Brian Bix, The Bogeyman of Three (or 
More) Parents, U. OF MINN. L. SCH. LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER SERIES NO. 08-22, at 3 (alteration in 
original); see also Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to Adopt Her Own Child: Parentage 
Laws for Children of Lesbian Couples in the Twenty-First Century, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 201, 267 
(2009).
2. State and courts’ recognition is discussed infra, Part II. California became the first state to 
adopt legislation explicitly recognizing three parents in 2013. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(c) (West 2016) 
amended by S.B. 1171, 2016 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 86 (West). Maine, which recognizes de facto parent-
age provisions, now explicitly permits multiple parents. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1891 
(2016) (de facto parents), and ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1853 (2015) (effective July 1, 2016) 
(“Consistent with the establishment of parentage under this chapter, a court may determine that a child 
has more than 2 parents.”).





      03/01/2017   10:44:39
38779-ckt_92-1 Sheet No. 12 Side B      03/01/2017   10:44:39
2 CARBONE MACRO EDITS (DO NOT DELETE) 1/18/2017 7:00 PM
10 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 92:1
tute’s (ALI) Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution (Principles) ex-
plicitly address the different functional roles an adult can assume in a 
child’s life, thereby permitting the establishment of multiple parents.4 The
Uniform Law Commission is engaged in drafting a model act that would 
allow custody rights for “non-parents.”5 Neither measure, however, fully 
reconciles expanded recognition with existing approaches to custody rights 
or support obligations for those adults deemed “parents.”6 Do all parents, 
whatever their numbers, acquire equal parental standing, with equal liabil-
ity for child support and equal standing to seek custody and visitation? And 
if they do, how should the courts apply such principles? Should they seek 
to equalize child support obligations and custody and visitation rights in 
accordance with the parents’ ability to provide for the child or should they 
take other approaches? Opponents of the recognition of three or more par-
ents have argued that such arrangements are unworkable,7 while propo-
nents tend to defer to the best interest standard, leaving individual judges to 
work out appropriate solutions.8
At the core of these disagreements is the issue of equality—can and 
should the principle of equal parental status survive the recognition of more 
than two adults as legal parents?9 We believe that it should not necessarily 
do so, and that the failure to address the possibility that a person may be a 
4. AM. LAW. INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS § 2.03(1)(b), (Ira M. Ellman et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES].
5. UNIF. LAW COMM’N , NON-PARENTAL CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION ACT (Interim Draft 
Apr. 19, 2016), http://www.uniformlaws.org/Committee.aspx?title=Non-
Parental%20Child%20Custody%20and%20Visitation%20Act. 
6. Some scholars have begun to raise the issue. See Susan F. Appleton, Parents by the Numbers,
37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11 (2009) [hereinafter Appleton, Numbers]; Katharine Baker, Bionormativity and 
the Construction of Parenthood, 42 GA. L. REV. 649 (2008) [hereinafter Baker, Bionormativity]; Mela-
nie B. Jacobs, More Parents, More Money: Reflections on the Financial Implications of Multiple Par-
entage, 16 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER, 217, 219 (2010) [hereinafter Jacobs, More Parents, More 
Money]; Melanie B. Jacobs, Parental Parity: Intentional Parenthood’s Promise, 64 BUFF. L. REV. 465, 
469 (2016) [hereinafter Jacobs, Parental Parity]; Dowd, supra note 1, at 250–61. 
7. ELIZABETH MARQUARDT, INST. FOR AM. VALUES, THE REVOLUTION IN PARENTHOOD: THE 
EMERGING GLOBAL CLASH BETWEEN ADULT RIGHTS AND CHILDREN’S NEEDS 10–15 (2006) (a survey 
of relevant developments in the United States and abroad, led by principal investigator Elizabeth Mar-
quardt).
8. Professor Katharine Baker observes, “[a]s more people claim a right to rear a child, the less 
coherent and unified that child’s sense of belonging is likely to be. The more people who have rights 
with regard to a child, the more likely the child will be the subject of litigation battles— the conse-
quences of which are notoriously bad for children.” Baker, Bionormativity, supra note 6, at 707–08 
(alteration in original); see also Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusive Status: 
The Need for Legal Alternatives when the Premise of the Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV.
879, 945 (1984) (“The key disadvantages of broadening access to parenthood are that it may increase 
the number of adults making claim to a child and enhance the indeterminacy that already exists in child 
custody law.”).
9. See, e.g., Jacobs, Why Just Two?, supra note 1, at 335 (arguing that “[m]ultiple parenthood 





      03/01/2017   10:44:39
38779-ckt_92-1 Sheet No. 13 Side A      03/01/2017   10:44:39
2 CARBONE MACRO EDITS (DO NOT DELETE) 1/18/2017 7:00 PM
2017] PARENTS, BABIES, AND MORE BABIES 11
legal parent without rights or responsibilities equal to those of other parents 
in the child’s life poses a major obstacle to full recognition of the realities
of the parenting arrangements in many families.
The idea of equal parental standing is a central tenet of modern family 
law, but the concept is relatively new and far from uniformly applied. Fam-
ily law once recognized the importance of conferring parental decision-
making power in the hands of a single adult.10 In the early nineteenth cen-
tury, the father was deemed head of household, and if he died, another man 
acquired the right to allocate resources and make decisions for the child.11
By the end of the nineteenth century, that presumption changed to one that 
assumed that children’s interests lay with maternal custody, at least for 
children “of tender years.”12 In the middle of the twentieth century, courts 
insisted on naming one, and only one, parent as a custodian, fearing that the 
conferral of custodial rights on more than one parent at a time would invite 
mischief and conflict.13 With increased divorce rates and greater recogni-
tion of gender equality, many couples wanted joint custody, and an aggres-
sive fathers’ rights movement has fought to enshrine shared parenting as 
important to children’s interests.14 Today, almost all jurisdictions have 
adopted a presumption that children’s interests lie with the continuing in-
volvement of both parents in the child’s life following a break-up,15 and
some jurisdictions go so far as to presume that the parents should enjoy as 
close as possible to equal time with the child.16
10. See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Nonmarriage, __ MD. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2016). 
11. MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER’S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN’S RIGHTS: THE HISTORY OF 
CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (Columbia Univ. Press 1994).
12. Id. at 61.
13. See, e.g., DeForest v. DeForest, 228 N.W.2d 919, 925 (N.D. 1975) (discussing the need for 
stability); Lapp v. Lapp, 293 N.W.2d 121, 130 (N.D. 1980) (associating shared custody with lax disci-
pline).
14. Deborah Dinner, The Divorce Bargain: The Fathers’ Rights Movement and Family Inequali-
ties 102 VA. L. REV. 79, 80 (2016); see Carbone & Cahn, Nonmarriage, supra note 10.
15. Dinner, supra note 14, at 121. 
16. See, e.g., Kelly A. Behre, Digging Beneath the Equality Language: The Influence of the 
Fathers’ Rights Movement on Intimate Partner Violence Public Policy Debates and Family Law Re-
form, 21 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 525 (2015). Behre explains that Arizona Senate Bill 1127, 
which passed in August 2012 and went into effect January 2013, encourages joint parenting by chang-
ing the best interest criteria to include maximum time with both parents. Id. at 595 n.355. Similarly, 
Arkansas Senate Bill 901 redefined the joint custody presumption following divorce to include equal 
parenting time and creating a law that enables a judge to modify joint custody to sole custody if “a
parent demonstrates a pattern of willfully creating conflict in an attempt to disrupt a current or pending 
joint-custody arrangement.” S.B. 901, 2013 Leg., 89th Sess. (Ark. 2013); see also ARK. CODE ANN.
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12 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 92:1
Those who favor limiting parental status to two adults maintain that 
recognition of more than that would be unworkable.17 What they fail to 
acknowledge is that the difficulties come not from recognition of more than 
two parents per se, but from insistence on equal status for the larger num-
ber of adults. In this article, we argue that equal status does not automati-
cally follow from parental recognition. In fact, where three or more adults 
share parenting, they rarely have—or can or should—assume equal roles in 
the child’s life.18 Instead, such families are more likely to involve one pri-
mary parent and other parents with varying degrees of involvement. This is 
true whether the multiple adults consist of a marital couple and a sperm 
donor or surrogate, a stepparent and two biological parents, or any number 
of other relationships.19
We accordingly argue that, where three parents are recognized, custo-
dial decisions should be determined, as they are for any child, in accord-
ance with the best interest of the child. We maintain further that, in 
determining the child’s interests, the courts should apply a primary caretak-
er presumption; that is, a presumption that the child’s interests lie with the 
strength of the child’s relationship to the primary parent and that the other 
parents’ custodial rights should be structured to avoid interference with the 
strength of that bond. In addition, we argue that the parents’ financial obli-
gations should take into account the child’s needs, the parents’ ability to 
contribute, and the allocation of responsibility during the parties’ relation-
ship. These custody and support presumptions, like other such presump-
tions, should be rebuttable.20 This leaves open the possibility of treating all 
three parents on equal terms where the three agree or where the three have 
been involved on an equal basis since the child’s birth and an allocation of 
rights and responsibilities is workable.
17. See Gabrielle Emanuel, Three (Parents) Can be a Crowd, But for Some It’s a Family, 3 (Mar. 
30, 2014, 6:08 PM), http://www.npr.org/2014/03/30/296851662/three-parents-can-be-a-crowd-but-for-
some-its-a-family (Brad Wilcox notes that “the concern here is that three parents will have more diffi-
culty giving their children the kind of consistency and stability that they need to thrive.”). 
18. See Baker, Bionormativity, supra note 6, at 655 (suggesting that a system of multiple parents 
is likely to involve “different degrees of parenthood, greater and lesser parenthood.”).
19. The principal exception occurs when two parents live together and share custody and a third 
adult seeks parental recognition. In these cases, the two parents who live together with the child consti-
tute a single decision-making unit and courts need not necessarily allocate responsibilities between the 
co-resident parents, who may enjoy equal status with each status with each other, legally and practical-
ly. When the courts are dealing with three or more adults who do not reside together, however, the 
allocation of parental rights and responsibilities becomes more complex. For discussion of these various 
scenarios, see Section IV, infra.
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2017] PARENTS, BABIES, AND MORE BABIES 13
This article makes two basic points. First, the three-parent family is 
here. Once states accept that parenthood does not depend on either biology 
or marriage, then three parents are inevitable unless the states go out of 
their way to rule that adults who otherwise meet their definitions of 
parenthood will not be recognized.21 Second, as three-parent family recog-
nition increases, there are difficult questions about how to manage the sta-
tus of each parent. This difficulty arises because two major trends in family 
law—the recognition of a multiplicity of family forms and the insistence on 
parental equality—are on a collision course.
In this article, we first address how the various frameworks for legal 
parenthood are consistent with recognition of more than two parents, how 
existing law is moving toward such recognition, and how marriage equality 
is likely to increase the pressure to acknowledge a variety of alternative 
family arrangements. Second, we review the existing cases and statutes that 
have fostered recognition of more than two parents, and document the fail-
ure to develop understandings about what such recognition entails when it
comes to raising a child. Third, we discuss the problems that would arise if 
the courts were to try to recognize multiple adults as parents and accord 
them equal standing in accordance with existing law. Finally, we argue that 
in those cases with more than two adults who function as parents, the solu-
tions lie in a more flexible approach that permits recognition of a primary 
caretaker principle.
I. THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL PARENTHOOD AND THE POTENTIAL 
FOR THREE PARENT RECOGNITION
Historically, marriage served to channel procreation and childrearing 
into stable, two-parent families. Today’s much more varied arrangements 
often involve multiple adults playing a variety of parental roles. The foun-
dations for the recognition of legal parenthood, applied in light of today’s
realities, will inexorably result in the recognition of multiple legal parents. 
Yet, while an increasing number of states recognize this inevitability, they 
have yet to fully explore the consequences of such developments. This 
section first examines the bases for legal parenthood, and then explains 
how these foundations apply to today’s families.
21. This does not necessarily mean, however, that even states that otherwise recognize three 
parents necessarily do so in every case in which three or more adults might qualify in a “parent” catego-
ry. See, e.g., In re Donovan L., Jr., 198 Cal. Rptr. 3d 550, 560, 565 (Ct. App. 2016) (concluding that the 
juvenile court erred in recognizing three parents, given its determination that the mother’s husband—
who had lived with mother and child—had been conclusively presumed to be the child’s father and the 
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A. Determining Legal Parents
Legal parents are those adults upon whom the law confers recognition, 
imposes financial obligations, and grants standing to seek visitation and 
custody.22 The foundation for legal parenthood, though it varies considera-
bly from state to state, proceeds from three factors:
1. Biology:23 States typically treat the woman who gives birth as a le-
gal parent on the basis of her genetic and gestational connection to the 
child,24 and provide various ways for the biological father to receive recog-
nition if he chooses to do so.25
2. Function: The American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of 
Family Dissolution and an increasing number of states provide recognition 
to adults who have assumed parental roles without a biological tie to the 
child, in some cases on the basis of function alone and in other cases on the 
basis of a combination of intent, assumption of a parental role, and/or the 
consent of the initial legal parent.26 We deliberately term this category 
“function” and do not include a separate category based on “intent.”27
22. That is, we use the term “legal” in this section to identify those parents who may be obliged to 
pay support and who have standing to seek custody. A person can be a biological parent without neces-
sary having recognition as a legal parent. See generally LESLIE J. HARRIS ET AL., FAMILY LAW ch. 13 
(4th ed. 2010).
23. We use biology here to include both gestational and genetic connections. Some commentators 
separate them. See Myrisha S. Lewis, Biology, Genetics, Nurture, and the Law: The Expansion of the 
Legal Definition of Family to Include Three or More Parents, 16 NEV. L.J. 743, 744–45 (2016) (recog-
nizing “at least” five bases for parenthood: gestation, genetic connection, function, intent and formali-
ty).
24. See, e.g., Dara E. Purvis, The Origin of Parental Rights: Labor, Intent, and Fathers, 41 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 645 (2014) (observing that mothers who give birth combine biological and functional 
bases for parenthood). 
25. Id. at 664 (observing that courts are more likely to rely exclusively on biology to impose 
financial obligations on fathers than to grant custodial rights). 
26. See supra notes 3–5; infra Part I.B. 
27. LGBT couples began to use the concept of “intent” as a basis for the determination of 
parenthood after the Buzzanca case in California. See Richard F. Storrow, Parenthood by Pure Inten-
tion: Assisted Reproduction and the Functional Approach to Parentage, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 597, 621–22
(2002) (examining reading of Buzzanca that places intent on a par with gestation or genetics). More 
recently, Doug NeJaime describes the combination of intent and function as a basis for recognition of 
dual parentage in California. Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, 129 
HARV. L. REV. 1185, 1211 (2016). We agree that where intent and function occur together, they justify 
recognition of parenthood, but we have also argued elsewhere that where they conflict, as in K.M. v. 
E.G, the California courts prefer function. The appellate court in R.M. v. T.A. explained that although 
the mother “may have initially intended to raise Child as a single parent, . . . during the first two years 
of Child’s life Mother’s relationship with RM developed such that RM, with Mother’s full support, 
undertook a parental role and established a parent-child relationship with Child.” 182 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
836, 853 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015) (emphasis added). In such a case, the courts base parentage on the as-
sumption of a parental function even where that conflicts with the parties’ understandings at the time 
the relationship began. Instead, we believe that intent is important in two different ways: first, as in the 
Buzzanca case, it is important where it encourages reliance and gives rise to parenthood based on 
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2017] PARENTS, BABIES, AND MORE BABIES 15
3. Formalities: Parental status may be established or transferred from 
one adult to another through formal legal actions such as adoption, paterni-
ty judgments, or marriage.
In the past,28 marriage served legally and practically to channel chil-
drearing into two parent families in ways that combined formality, biology, 
and function.29 While the law recognized the woman who gave birth as a 
legal mother on the basis of both biology (i.e., genetics and gestation)  and 
function (the assumption of responsibility for the child over the course of 
the pregnancy),,30 fathers gained legal status as parents primarily through 
marriage. A man who did not marry the mother of his child forfeited the 
right to a say in the child’s life.31 Moreover, the marital presumption, while 
a presumption of biology, also limited the evidence that could rebut the 
presumption, effectively providing a fig leaf that covered up the sometimes 
messy facts of reproduction, ratifying the husband as a parent without too 
close an examination of biology.32 And while women could legally be sin-
gle parents, their rights to financial and social support typically depended 
on marriage, creating powerful incentives to enter into two parent families 
rights may be important practically and constitutionally. See E. Gary Spitko, The Constitutional Func-
tion of Biological Paternity: Evidence of the Biological Mother’s Consent to the Biological Father’s
Co-Parenting of Her Child, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 97, 99 (2006); June Carbone, From Partners to Parents 
Revisited: How Will Ideas of Partnership Influence the Emerging Definition of California Parenthood?,
7 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 3 (2006). We do not see intent as a basis for the grant of parental 
rights, however, by itself; that is, we do not see the intent to be a parent as overriding biology, function, 
and formalities where it does not give rise to estoppel. The mere fact that a mother’s boyfriend intends 
to be a father, for example, does not ordinarily give him a right to parental status, unless he has assumed 
a parental function or in some cases relied on the mother’s promises. His unilateral intent, without 
anything more is not enough. See also Lewis, supra note 23, at 744–55 (distinguishing between intent 
and function). 
28. That is, the relatively recent past. Centuries ago, higher mortality rates meant practically that 
marriages ended through death at about the same rates as modern marriages end through divorce. 
Stepparents (and perhaps even “evil stepmothers”) were commonplace. 
29. Carl E. Schneider, The Channeling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 495, 523 
(1992). See also Susan F. Appleton, The Forgotten Family Law of Eisenstadt v. Baird, 28 YALE L.J. &
FEMINISM 1, 44 (2016); Linda C. McClain, Love, Marriage, and the Baby Carriage: Revisiting the 
Channeling Function of Family Law, 28 Cardozo L. Rev. 2133, 2133–35 (2007). 
30. And as the genetic mother in the era before IVF.
31. The states varied greatly in the degree to which they recognized unmarried fathers or imposed 
obligations upon them. See Baker, Bionormativity, supra note 6, at 659 n.48 (“not until1973 [did] the 
U.S. Supreme Court struck down a Texas law imposing a support liability on parents of legitimate 
children but not on parents of illegitimate children); Serena Mayeri, Foundling Fathers: (Non-
)marriage and Parental Rights in the Age of Equality, 125 YALE L.J. 2292, 2302 (2016) (exploring the 
history of non-marital fathers). 
32. Theresa Glennon, Somebody’s Child: Evaluating the Erosion of the Marital Presumption of 
Paternity, 102 W. VA. L. REV. 547, 573, 564 (2000); June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Marriage and the 
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16 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 92:1
and stay there.33 The result encouraged the unity of biology, function and 
formalities and enshrined two parent families as “natural” and normative.34
B. Legal Parenthood and Today’s Families
The advent of assisted reproduction, women’s economic independ-
ence, readily available paternity testing, and increased family variety have
challenged the marital-based two-parent family norm. With less stable fam-
ilies, multiple adults may come in and out of a child’s life.35 With reliable 
DNA testing, the facts of reproduction are readily ascertainable for anyone 
who wishes to know them. And with assisted reproduction, the biological 
connections between parents and children have become more varied: the 
woman who gives birth may not necessarily be the genetic mother of a 
child, and three-parent in vitro fertilization—with three adults contributing 
genetic material in the creation of children—already exists.36 Considering
biology, function and formalities therefore supports recognition of three or 
more parents in complex ways, and today’s families frequently involve 
more than two adults in caring for a child.37 Three developments in particu-
lar compel such recognition:
1. Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) Families: For 
same-sex couples who wish to produce a child they intend to raise together, 
reproduction necessarily involves more than two adults. Many lesbian cou-
ples would like to use a known donor in conceiving a child and include the 
donor in the child’s life in various ways. Gay men often recruit egg donors 
and gestational carriers in creating a child, and in some cases wish to use 
egg donors or carriers who may have a close relationship to one or both of 
the men.38 These evolving family relationships involve more than two 
33. Indeed, many mothers abandoned children in the hopes that others would be able to provide 
better care for them. See Baker, Bionormativity, supra note 6, at 656–57.
34. Susan Appleton argues that “the allure of a bi-parentage rule lies in its ability to naturalize a 
normative family in which only enduringly monogamous heterosexual couples reproduce. This position 
embodies a strong version of what Baker calls ‘bionormativity.’” Appleton, Numbers, supra note 6, at 
21.
35. When parenthood becomes less binary and exclusive, it becomes less private and less biologi-
cal as well. Baker, Bionormativity, supra note 6, at 655.
36. See Carbone & Cahn, Marriage and the Marital Presumption Post-Obergefell, supra note 32
at 665, for a review of recent developments; see Jennifer Couzin-Frankel, Unanswered Questions 
Surround Baby Born to Three Parents, SCI. MAG., Sept. 29, 2016, 
http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/09/unanswered-questions-surround-baby-born-three-parents.
37. See id.
38. See, e.g., June Carbone & Jody L. Madeira, The Role of Agency: Compensated Surrogacy and 
the Institutionalization of Assisted Reproduction Practices, 90 WASH. L. REV. (ONLINE) 7, 19–25
(2015), http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/facpub/1952 (describing case involving sister who acted 
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adults on a variety of terms. For example, while all lesbian couple require a 
sperm donor to give birth, some “sperm donors” provide sperm pursuant to 
an understanding that they play a parental role while others do so in cir-
cumstances where they expect to have no further involvement in the child’s
life.39 Yet, none of these understandings are necessarily enforceable and, as 
a practical matter, the donor’s role may change over the course of the 
child’s life. In addition, even where a same-sex couple agrees at the con-
ception of a child that they will both play parental roles, they may separate, 
and repartner over the course of a child’s minority, introducing new adults 
playing parental roles in the child’s life.40 LGBT advocates have been in 
the forefront of efforts to gain recognition of more than two parents in part 
because they have consciously fought to create alternate models that better 
fit their circumstances.41 At the same time, many lesbian couples have been 
eager to limit recognition of sperm donors as full legal parents with equal 
rights who could intrude on the arrangements that the women work out for 
themselves.42
2. Stepparent Families: Higher divorce rates have led to higher rates of 
remarriage,43 introducing stepparents into the children’s lives. Stepparents
may play a variety of roles: they may become functional parents to the 
exclusion of one or both of the biological parents, supplement the role of 
the biological parents to varying degrees, or play a significantly lesser role, 
Mahoney, 8 Surprising Facts About Egg Donors, MOMMY MAN BLOG (June 20, 2012), https://jerry-
mahoney.com/2012/06/20/8-surprising-facts-about-egg-donors/.
39. Indeed, even where two same-sex parents have used adoption to receive formal recognition, 
they have not always severed the parental status of the sperm or egg donor as part of the adoption 
process. See Carbone, From Partners to Parents Revisited, supra note 27, at 13 n.60, 14 n.67. See also
June Carbone and Naomi Cahn, Jane the Virgin and Other Stories of Unintentional Parenthood, ___
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2017).
40. A particularly complicated case led California to recognize the possibility of more than two 
legal parents. See In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856, 862 (Cal. 2011), superseded by statute, S.B. 274, 
2013 Cal. Leg. Sess. § 1 (Cal. 2013). Of course, the disputes that arise from separation of two initial 
legal parents and the inclusion of new partners in the child’s life resemble (and are often identical to) 
those involving stepparents. See, e.g., Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepparents As Third Parties in Relation 
to Their Stepchildren, 40 FAM. L.Q. 81, 84 (2006) (observing that “[u]nder the traditional model of 
parenthood and family, this important family status [legal parenthood] is limited to the categories of 
biological and adoptive parents and excludes stepparents who marry the custodial parents of minor 
children.”).
41. “The label ‘parent’ mattered [in Jacob-Shultz and the Canadian case], because the law makes 
such titles important. The courts honored and respected the particular families—in which no one voiced 
opposition to parental status for any of the three adults in each case—and also legitimated the lived 
experiences of the children in question.” Appleton, Numbers, supra note 6, at 68 (internal quotations 
added).
42. See, e.g, Deborah L. Forman, Exploring the Boundaries of Families Created with Known 
Sperm Providers: Who’s in and Who’s Out?, 19 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 41, 93-94 (2016), 
43. ANDREW CHERLIN, THE MARRIAGE GO-ROUND 3–12 (2009) (observing that American mar-
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particularly in circumstances where both biological parents continue to play 
active roles in the child’s life.44 The law, however, has historically treated 
stepparents in all or nothing terms; those who adopt receive full parental 
recognition to the exclusion of at least one of the biological parents, while 
those who do not may not receive any parental status at all once the rela-
tionship ends.45 Stepparents have sought and increasingly won increased 
recognition,46 but questions remain about whether such recognition neces-
sarily must come through the replacement of a biological parent and the 
circumstances, if any, in which their parental status equals that of an initial 
parent.47 Moreover, stepparents are less well-organized than LGBT advo-
cates and have less uniform interests; after all, many adults are a full legal 
parent in one family and a stepparent in a second family.48 And many step-
parents—unlike same-sex couples who intentionally set out to create three-
parent families—do not necessarily have a single model in mind when they 
create blended families. Spouses with older children at the time of their 
marriage, for example, may not want or expect stepparents to assume a role 
equivalent to that of the legal parent, while spouses with younger children 
or spouses without a second biological parent active in the child’s life may 
encourage their new spouses to assume such a role. Many stepparents find, 
moreover, that their role changes over time, often in ways that they did not 
necessarily anticipate at the time of the marriage.49
44. See, e.g., David Chambers, Stepparents, Biologic Parents, and the Law’s Perceptions of 
“Family” after Divorce in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 102, 104–08, 118–19 (Stephen D. 
Sugarman & Herman Hill Kay eds., 1990) (describing varied stepparent role).
45. See Margaret M. Mahoney, Stepparents As Third Parties in Relation to Their Stepchildren, 40 
FAM. L.Q. 81, 84 (2006) (observing that “[u]nder the traditional model of parenthood and family, this 
important family status [legal parenthood] is limited to the categories of biological and adoptive parents 
and excludes stepparents who marry the custodial parents of minor children.”); Mary Ann Mason &
Nicole Zayac, Rethinking Stepparent Rights: Has the Ali Found A Better Definition?, 36 FAM. L.Q. 227, 
227 (2002) (observing that “[o]verall there is a lack of legal recognition of the stepparent/stepchild 
relationship . . . If the marriage terminates through divorce or death, they most often have no rights of 
custody or visitation, no matter how longstanding their stepparent role.”). More recently, however, the 
states have expanded the ability of to seek visitation as third parties, but the courts have noted that the 
extension of such rights still requires deference to the legal parents in accordance with Troxel and
therefore requires a heightened showing before the courts can award even visitation rights. Mahoney, 
supra at 103–04.
46. See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Parness, Third Party Stepparent Childcare, 67 MERCER L. REV. 383, 391 
(2016).
47. See Mahoney, supra note 45, at 84.
48. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Engelkens, 354 Ill. App. 3d 790, 791, 821 N.E.2d 799, 801 
(2004)(involving custody and visitation issues with respect to both a child born within the marriage, 
who turned out not to be the biological child of the husband, and the husband’s child from a previous 
relationship).
49. See, e.g., Kimberly Michele Leyerle, A Shift from Incidental to Instrumental: A Promise of 
Stability When Stepparents Have Been A Primary Source of Parenting Support, 14 WHITTIER J. CHILD 
& FAM. ADVOC. 90 (2015) (asking “what legal rights do residential stepparents obtain when they shift 
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3. Unmarried Families: Increasing reproduction outside of marriage 
involves higher rates of multi-partner fertility and more complex family 
structures. While biological mothers and fathers have become much more 
likely to sign voluntary acknowledgments of paternity at birth and establish 
formal legal parenthood on the basis of biology,50 these relationships are 
much more likely than married ones to end during the children’s minority. 
When the relationships end, unmarried fathers’ are less likely than married 
ones to seek parenting orders,51 and less likely to receive custodial orders if 
they do end up in court.52 Given the greater relationship instability, unmar-
ried parents are more likely to cohabit with multiple adults, who assume a 
variety of parenting roles that range from fully committed to transitory, and 
they often go on to bear additional children with new partners.53 As a prac-
tical matter, therefore, these families often include more than two adults 
playing parental roles, and the parental roles fall on a broad continuum of 
adult involvement. Moreover, the poorer the community and the greater the 
variety in family arrangements, the less likely parents are to share parenting 
on an equal basis or to formalize the parenting arrangements that exist.54
The interests of these families, however, may be even more poorly repre-
sented in the legal system than those of stepparents, and fathers and moth-
and emotional support?”); id. at 94 (noting distinctions between stepparents who have been “longtime 
caregivers” versus others).
50. See Leslie J. Harris, Reforming Paternity Law to Eliminate Gender, Status, And Class Ine-
quality, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1295, 1300, 1308–13 (2013) (observing that most unmarried parents 
sign voluntary acknowledgements of paternity).
51. See PATRICIA BROWN & STEVEN T. COOK, CHILDREN’S PLACEMENT ARRANGEMENTS IN 
DIVORCE AND PATERNITY CASES IN WISCONSIN, 2, 9–12, 18–19 (Inst. for Research on Poverty, Univ. 
of Wisconsin-Madison 2012); see also Stacy Brustin & Lisa V. Martin, Paved with Good Intentions: 
Unintended Consequences of Federal Proposals to Integrate Child Support and Parenting Time, 48
IND. L. REV. 802, 815 (2015)(“Unlike divorce and custody proceedings, which typically permit or 
require parents to address issues of custody and child support together, proceedings in child support 
courts or administrative tribunals generally do not permit parents to address issues of custody or visita-
tion”).
52. See PATRICIA BROWN & STEVEN T. COOK, supra note 51, at 2, 9–12, 18–19; see also Brustin 
& Martin, supra note 51, at 815 (noting the inability to raise custodial claims in some proceedings).
53. See, e.g., Karen Benjamin Guzzo, New Partners, More Kids: Multiple-Partner Fertility in the 
United States, 654 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. & SOC. SCI. 66, tbl.2 (2014). See also Baker,
Bionormativity, supra note 6 at 655 (“Because contemporary adult relationships are less likely to be 
permanently binary and exclusive, so is parenthood.”).
54. Sociologists report, for example, that “certain conditions—such as extreme economic margin-
ality, frequent conflict, involvement in crime, incarceration, or even infidelity—can be dealt with in a 
nonmarital union but would virtually mandate a divorce if they were married.” Laura Tach & Kathryn 
Edin, The Compositional and Institutional Sources of Union Dissolution for Married and Unmarried 
Parents in the United States, 50 DEMOGRAPHY 1789, 1815 (2013) (citations omitted). They also find 
that more than one-third of unmarried fathers have been incarcerated, compared with less than 10% of 





      03/01/2017   10:44:39
38779-ckt_92-1 Sheet No. 17 Side B      03/01/2017   10:44:39
2 CARBONE MACRO EDITS (DO NOT DELETE) 1/18/2017 7:00 PM
20 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 92:1
ers may not necessarily agree on either what they would like to see the law 
do or even on the terms of their on-going relationships.55
All of these groups involve more than two adults in parental roles, and 
recognition of a greater number of parents would be appropriate in many of 
these cases without agreement on what the nature of that recognition should 
be. The question therefore is how greater recognition to additional parents 
can be reconciled with the principles that govern family law generally.
II. FINDING THREE PARENTS
As this section shows, a growing number of states permit recognition 
of three parents through case law or legislation. While these jurisdictions 
allow more than two people to assume the title “parent,” few have system-
atically worked through what this recognition means, and the states that 
have addressed the issue do not necessarily agree with each other on what 
multiple recognition means. In this section, we review the existing states of 
multiple parenthood and identify cases in which courts have attempted to 
work through the complexities of not only assigning parentage, but deter-
mining what parental status means in custody and other determinations.
A. Dual Paternity
Louisiana became the first state to recognize three parents when it 
adopted a system of dual paternity.56 The Supreme Court of the United 
States had declared Louisiana law to be unconstitutional when it limited 
inheritance rights to legitimate children.57 The Louisiana Supreme Court 
responded by concluding that children could inherit from their nonmarital 
biological fathers without losing their status as the legal children of their 
mothers’ husbands, and thus they could inherit from both men.58 In later 
cases, the Louisiana courts extended the concept to find biological fathers 
liable for support, even where another man retained his status as the child’s
55. Compare KATHRYN EDIN & MARIA KEFELAS, PROMISES I CAN KEEP: WHY POOR WOMEN 
PUT MOTHERHOOD BEFORE MARRIAGE (2005) (showing the mothers’ viewpoints) with KATHRYN EDIN 
& TIMOTHY J. NELSON, DOING THE BEST I CAN: FATHERHOOD IN THE INNER CITY (2013) (showing the 
men’s perspectives).
56. E.g., Warren v. Richard, 296 So. 2d 813, 815 (La. 1974). 
57. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 70–71 (1968) (concluding that “under the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a State may not create a right of action in favor of children for the 
wrongful death of a parent and exclude illegitimate children from the benefit of such a right.”)
58. Warren, 296 So. 2d at 817. Under the Uniform Probate Code, a child can inherit through a 
parent whose rights have been terminated, in some circumstances; notwithstanding the three lines of 
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presumed father because of marriage to the mother.59 The Louisiana courts 
did not, however, divide custody, explaining that “a biological father who 
cannot meet the best-interest-of-the-child standard retains his obligation of 
support but cannot claim the privilege of parental rights.”60
The Louisiana courts, in administering these provisions, have never 
treated three parents as having equal physical and legal custodial rights 
with respect a child. Instead, the one case we could find where two men 
shared custodial rights in a child involved circumstances where the biologi-
cal father had married the mother and lived with her.61 In that case, alt-
hough the appellate court found no basis to transfer domiciliary custody 
from the husband to the biological mother and father, it affirmed the part of 
the trial court order that had extended to the biological father the same 
rights the mother enjoyed to joint legal custody and visitation.62
Louisiana has since amended its paternity statutes in order to limit the 
ability of a putative father to destabilize a two-parent family.63 Consequent-
59. See Poche v. Poche (In re Interest of Poche), 368 So. 2d 175, 176–77 (La. Ct. App. 1979) (“It 
sufficed to simply determine that the child was in fact the biological child of the alleged father. The fact 
that the law considered the child to be the legitimate child of another will not alter the result and ‘cannot 
deprive her of a right which illegitimate children generally may have . . . ‘“) (quoting Warren, 296 So. 
2d at 817)). In Smith v. Cole, 553 So. 2d 847, 848 (La. 1989), the divorced mother obtained “permanent 
custody” of the two children of the marriage. The court explained that the husband could not be found. 
She later brought a filiation action against the biological father of a third child. The court explained that 
the husband was the presumed father, but this recognition did not preclude recognizing the biological 
father’s “actual paternity.” Id. at 854. It noted that:
Louisiana law may provide the presumption that the husband of the mother is the legal father 
of her child while it recognizes a biological father’s actual paternity. When the presumptive 
father does not timely disavow paternity, he becomes the legal father. A filiation action 
brought on behalf of the child, then, merely establishes the biological fact of paternity. The 
filiation action does not bastardize the child or otherwise affect the child’s legitimacy status.
Id. at 855. 
The court found that the biological mother and father were both responsibility for supporting the child, 
but explicitly “decline[d] for now to hold the legal father will, in all factual contexts, be made to share 
the support obligations with the biological father and the mother.” Id.
60. T.D. v. M.M.M., 730 So. 2d 873, 876 (La. 1999). In Geen v. Geen, a divorce action, custody 
had been awarded to the husband. 666 So. 2d 1192, 1193 (La. App. 1995), writ denied, 669 So. 2d 1224 
(La. 1996). The mother later married the biological father, who sought to establish paternity, and both 
of them moved to modify the custody award. The court of appeal reversed the trial court grant of a 
change of custody, finding that while the biological father was entitled to establish paternity, he had not 
established a basis for transferring custody from the ex-husband, who had an established relationship 
with the child. The court nonetheless affirmed the original custody decree, extending joint legal custody 
to all three parents, but retained residential custody with the ex-husband. Id. at 1197. It found that “The 
relationship between the parties, and among each of the parties and the child, is as good as it can be 
under the circumstances.” Id.
61. Geen, 666 So. 2d at 1194.
62. The Geen court explicitly stated, “We will, therefore, so amend the judgment to reflect that 
the parties were awarded joint legal custody.” Id. 
63. “If the child is presumed to be the child of another man, the action shall be instituted within 
one year from the day of the birth of the child. Nevertheless, if the mother in bad faith deceived the 
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ly, the biological father has only one year in which to establish paternity in 
cases in which the child already has a legal father.64 Louisiana thus pro-
moted the stability of two-parent families, and it did so not by extending 
recognition to multiple parents as it had in the past, but by making it more 
difficult to do so.65
The dilemma Louisiana faced arose from the conflict between the
marital presumption and the facts of biological paternity.66 Every state has 
wrestled with this issue to some degree, reaching different results.67 As a 
practical matter, these cases often involve two men who have played or 
wish to play parental roles.68 While most states have responded by choos-
ing to recognize only one of the men as a legal parent, California dealt with 
the issue by expanding the category of parents who qualified as “presumed 
parents” and thus were entitled to standing to seek custody and visitation.69
This allowed California courts discretion to choose among the potential 
parents on the basis of the circumstances of individual cases without forc-
ing a choice rigidly based on either biology or marriage.70 The practical 
consequence resembles dual paternity in Louisiana, with the courts typical-
ly choosing to protect the child’s established relationships, but not neces-
father knew or should have known of his paternity, or within ten years from the day of the birth of the 
child, whichever first occurs.” LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 198 (2006). See id. art. 197, on the child’s right 
to sue. See generally Katherine Shaw Spaht, Who’s Your Momma, Who Are Your Daddies? Louisiana’s
New Law of Filiation, 67 LA. L. REV. 307 (2007).
64. Katherine Spaht observed that the purpose of the relatively short time period was “to protect 
the child from the upheaval of such litigation and its consequences in circumstances where the child 
may actually live in an existing intact family with his mother and presumed father or may have become 
attached over many years to the man presumed to be his father.” Id. at 324 (citing art. 198 cmt. e 
(2006).
65. Spaht notes further that the statute limited the circumstances in which the mother could 
initiate an action disavowing the paternity of her husband and that if she succeeded: “A judgment 
rendered in favor of the mother terminates existing child custody and visitation orders. However, the 
former husband in extraordinary circumstances may be granted reasonable visitation if the court finds it 
is in the best interest of the child.” Id. at 316 (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:403(C)(1)). In these 
cases, the child would have two, not three, legal parents, but the former husband would have the ability 
to seek visitation as a third party.
66. Indeed, Spaht observes that Louisiana adopted dual paternity principally as a way to insure 
continuing recognition of the husband’s parentage. Id. at 321 (noting that “after Michael H. v. Gerald 
D., . . . the Law Institute Council concluded that denying the biological father of a child the right to 
establish his filiation when another man was presumed to be the father was not unconstitutional” sug-
gesting that Louisiana lawmakers thought it was unconstitutional beforehand.). 
67. See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Marriage, Parentage, and Child Support, 45 FAM. L. Q.
219, 220 (2011).
68. See, e.g., Michael H., v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
69. Carbone, From Partners to Parents Revisited, supra note 27 at 14, 23 (observing, however, 
that in some of the cases that involved same-sex parents the California courts looked the other way 
while two lesbians established parental relationships without terminating the parental status of the 
sperm donor).
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sarily recognizing more than two parents with custodial rights at any one 
time.71 These cases laid the foundation for California’s eventual statutory 
recognition of the possibility of three legal parents.72 In contrast, the ALI, 
to which we will turn next, dealt with the same issues by incorporating the 
marital presumption into its adoption of parenthood by estoppel and de 
facto parenthood provisions.73
B. Parents by Estoppel and De Facto Parentage
The ALI, in its Principles, sought to provide greater recognition of 
adults who assumed functional roles as parents without either a biological 
or formal tie to the child.74 In doing so, the Principles acknowledged the 
possibility that more than two adults would meet the standards they articu-
lated. Since then, several states have used recognition of functional parents, 
either by statute explicitly addressing de facto parenthood or through inter-
pretation of individual state parentage provisions, to grant standing to more 
than two adults who seek standing to assert parental rights. This section 
first describes the ALI Principles, then reviews state legislation recogniz-
ing de facto parentage, and finally summarizes various state cases expand-
ing recognition of functional parents in ways that lay the foundation for 
more than two parents.
1. The ALI Principles
In the 2002 Principles, the ALI created two different categories of 
adults who could receive recognition as parents based on function.75 Appli-
cation of these categories, as the ALI recognized, creates a foundation for 
the recognition of more than two parents.76
The first involves “parents by estoppel,” which includes those adults 
who, though not otherwise legal parents, have assumed a parental role “as 
part of a prior co-parenting agreement with the child’s legal parent (or, if 
71. Carbone, From Partners to Parents Revisited, supra note 27 at 3 (explaining that under 
California doctrine, “the courts can pick and choose who makes a good father.”)
72. See infra notes 122–130, discussing CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(c) (West 2016). 
73. Indeed, the ALI Principles overlap with some of the circumstances that could arise where a 
married man raises his wife’s child either with the mistaken belief that the child is his biological off-
spring or holding the child as his own even though he knows that he is not biologically related to the 
child. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, § 2.03(1)(b). In some states, the courts treat husbands as de 
facto parents rather than simply relying on the marital presumption. See Althouse, supra note 1, at 176. 
This is true in part because many states have made the marital presumption easier to rebut. See Carbone 
& Cahn, Marriage, Parentage, and Child Support, supra note 67.
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there are two legal parents, both parents)”.77 The term “estoppel” arises 
because the legal parent or parents who invited the assumption of a parental 
role are then estopped from denying recognition of the other adult’s paren-
tal status.78 The Principles determine the assumption of a functional role by 
requiring that the parent by estoppel be either obligated to pay child sup-
port, have lived with the child for at least two years with a reasonable, 
good-faith belief that he was the child’s biological father, or held himself 
out and accepted full and permanent responsibilities as a parent.79 Recogni-
tion as a parent under this section is subject to a determination that such 
recognition is in the child’s interests, and it allows the parent by estoppel to 
seek custody on the same terms as other legal parents.80 While the Princi-
ples do not preclude recognition of more than two parents, the comments 
observe that “the case for recognition of an additional parent is weaker if a 
child already has two (or more) parents, although this factor is not disposi-
tive, particularly if one of the child’s legal parents has formed no signifi-
cant parental relationship with the child.”81
The Principles, both in their definition of parenthood and their alloca-
tion of custodial time, give more weight to functional relationships than to 
biological or formal ties. They accordingly make it unlikely that courts 
would grant comparable custodial awards to more than two adults, unless 
all three have assumed shared responsibility for the child before the disso-
lution of the relationships.82
The second category recognizes “de facto” parents and defines a de 
facto parent as someone who:
(1) lived with the child for a significant period of time not less than two 
years; (2) with the agreement of the legal parent; (3) primarily to form a 
parent-child relationship and not primarily for financial compensation, or 
as a result of a legal parent’s complete failure to perform caretaking 
functions; and (4) regularly performed a majority of the caretaking func-
tions for the child or regularly performed a share of caretaking functions 
77. Id. 
78. For a more general discussion of parenthood by estoppel, see HARRIS ET AL., FAMILY LAW,
supra note 22, at 956. 
79. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, § 2.03. 
80. Id.
81. Id. 
82. The ALI Principles specify that: 
[T]he court should allocate custodial responsibility so that the proportion of custodial time the child 
spends with each parent approximates the proportion of time each parent spent performing caretaking 
functions for the child prior to the parents’ separation or, if the parents never lived together, before the 
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at least as great as that of the parent with whom the child primarily 
lived.83
These categories create a hierarchy of custodial rights.84 While a par-
ent by estoppel occupies a status comparable to that of a legal parent, de 
facto parents do not. A de facto parent, for example, cannot receive primary 
custodial responsibility if a fit legal parent is able and willing to take such 
responsibility.85 A de facto parent, in turn, is favored over non-parents.86 In
addition, while the de facto parent category also allows for recognition of 
more than two parents, the Principles recommend that the courts “should 
limit or deny an allocation otherwise to be made if, in light of the number 
of other individuals to be allocated responsibility, the allocation would be 
impractical.”87 And the Principles indicate that significant decision-making 
for the child should not be shared by more than two parents.88 The Princi-
ples thus extend the boundaries of those who can be recognized as perform-
ing parent-like responsibilities, without any effort to treat them as equally 
important to the child.
2. De facto Parentage
Following adoption of the ALI Principles, a number of states have de-
cided to recognize de facto parents, either by adopting the ALI Principles
or by using the concept in accordance with individual state terms. Every 
state that has recognized this type of functional basis for parenthood has 
opened the door to the possibility of three parents, though not all of the 
states have decided whether they will permit such recognition or how to 
allocate responsibility once multiple parents exist.89
83. Id. § 2.03(1)(c).
84. See Appleton, Numbers, supra note 6, at 29–30 (describing the principles as creating a paren-
tal hierarchy).
85. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, § 2.18(1)(a). The Principles provide that courts: 
(a) should not allocate the majority of custodial responsibility to a de facto parent over the ob-
jection of a legal parent or a parent by estoppel who is fit and willing to assume the majority 
of custodial responsibility unless
(i) the legal parent or parent by estoppel has not been performing a reasonable share of 
parenting functions or
(ii) the available alternatives would cause harm to the child. 
Id. In addition, de facto parents on not liable for support solely because of their status as de facto par-
ents. Id.
86. Id. § 2.18(2).
87. Id. § 2.18(1)(b).
88. Althouse, supra note 1, at 189. 
89. Such functional recognition includes not only de facto parenthood provisions, but third party 
visitation statute that allow stepparents or other to seek custodial rights. Some families, who wish to 
create three parent families, have used some provisions of these provisions as a foundation for contrac-
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a. De facto Parentage Statutes: Some jurisdictions, including the Dis-
trict of Columbia and Delaware, have enacted statutes recognizing that an 
adult might become a de facto parent with the permission of the child’s
parent or parents.90
Delaware has used the concept of de facto parents to sort out the allo-
cation of parental rights where a woman, who conceived a child with one 
man, marries or lives with another man who assumes responsibility for the 
child. In Jw. S. Jr. v. Em. S., for example, the court recognized the biologi-
cal father as a legal father on the basis of paternity tests and the mother’s
former husband as a de facto parent. 91 The husband, who had raised the 
child since birth, had full legal custody and primary physical custody on the 
basis of a temporary emergency order.92 The biological father had been 
enjoying visitation one day a week, and he became involved in litigation 
only when the de facto father and mother went to court.93 The de facto 
father did not object to inclusion of the biological father in the child’s
life.94 The court concluded that the child viewed both men as her fathers 
and that all three—the two men and the mother—would have standing as 
legal parents to seek custody.95 On the other hand, in a subsequent case, a 
different Delaware court refused to award de facto parent status to a hus-
band, who allegedly abused the children, on the ground that the seven 
months he had lived with the children was not long enough to establish a 
parental relationship.96
b. “Common law” De facto Parenthood Recognition: Other states 
have recognized more than two parents without express statutory authoriza-
tion. These states have simply found, on the basis of the individual circum-
stances of the cases before them, that more than adults have met the 
See, e.g, MARTHA ERTMAN, Introduction to LOVE’S PROMISES, at xv (Michael Bronski ed. 2015) 
(describing her three-parent family of choice).
90. D.C. CODE § 16-831.01(1)(A)(iii) (2016); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 8-201(c)(1) (2016) (if 
the de facto parent “[h]as had the support and consent of the child’s parent or parents”). See also Nan-
cy Polikoff, More Thoughts on the Delaware De Facto Parenting Law—A Child Can Have Three 
Parents, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE (Aug. 15, 2009, 2:36 PM) 
http://beyondstraightandgaymarriage.blogspot.co/2009/08/more-thoughts-on-delaware-de-facto.html.
DC deems a de facto parent a “parent” for purposes of establishing custody and child support, and 
defines a “third party” as someone other than a parent or de facto parent. D.C. CODE §§ 16-831.01(5), 
831.03 (definition of “third party”). For further discussion, see COURTNEY G. JOSLIN ET AL., LESBIAN,
GAY, BISEXUAL AND TRANSGENDER FAMILY LAW §§ 7:5, 7:7 (Westlaw, Thomson Reuters, 2016) 
(state use of terms such as “psychological” and “de facto” parent to recognize functional parenthood).
91. Nos. CS11–01557, CS13–01083, 2013 WL 6174814, at *6 (Del. Fam. Ct. May 29, 2013).
92. Id. at *2.
93. Id. 
94. Id.
95. Id. at *6.
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statutory or case-based definitions of parenthood. The courts in these juris-
dictions have then struggled with how to allocate parental rights, and when 
they have addressed the issue, they have generally established a hierar-
chical relationship between the adults.
Pennsylvania was one of the first to use functional parentage provi-
sions to recognize three parents. Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob97 involved a custody 
dispute between two same-sex partners—who had entered a civil union in 
Vermont—and the biological father—who was actively involved in caring 
for the children. The same-sex partner who did not have a biological rela-
tionship with the child sought custodial rights on the basis of in loco paren-
tis.98 The Pennsylvania court explained that the “rights and liabilities 
arising out of that relation [in loco parentis] are, as the words imply, exact-
ly the same as between parent and child.”99 In loco parentis status provides 
third parties, defined as “persons other than biological parents,” standing to 
seek custody or visitation over the objections of a biological parent.100 De-
spite this, the court emphasized that the parental status based on in loco 
parentis is not equal to parental status based on biology.101 Instead, the 
court observed that:
[W]here the custody dispute is between a biological parent and a third 
party . . . the parents have a prima facie right to custody which will be 
forfeited only if convincing reasons appear that the child’s best inter-
est[s] will be served by an award to the third party. Thus, even before the 
proceedings start, the evidentiary scale is tipped, and tipped hard, to the 
[biological] parents’ side.102
In Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, the court then awarded the former partner 
primary custody of one of the four children at issue, awarded the other 
partner primary custody of three children, and provided the sperm donor 
with partial custody, one weekend a month, of his two biological chil-
dren.103 The court of appeals upheld the award, noting that the award to the 
biological father was not at issue in the appeal.104 It reversed and remanded 
on the issue of support, however, because the trial court had concluded that 
it had no authority to require support from more than two parents.105 The 
97. Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 2007).
98. Id. at 477. 
99. Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Cameron, 179 A.2d 270, 272 (Pa. Sup. Ct.1962)). 
100. Id.; see Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to 
Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459, 
502–09 (1990).
101. Jacob, 923 A.2d at 477.
102. Id. (quoting Charles v. Stehlik, 744 A.2d 1255, 1258 (Pa. 2000)). 
103. Id. at 476.
104. Id. at 476, n.2.
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appellate court stated that it was “not convinced that the calculus of support 
arrangements cannot be reformulated” to account for the proportional con-
tributions of both obligees, and held that equitable estoppel principles pre-
vented an adult who claimed parental status for custody purposes from 
denying responsibility for financial support.106
As a practical matter, the decision recognized all three adults as par-
ents, and divided custody rights and financial obligations among the three. 
In doing so, however, it made no pretense of treating all three parents 
equally. Instead, in accordance with the children’s interests, it identified a 
primary parent for each child, and adjusted the awards in accordance with 
that determination.107
In subsequent cases, the Pennsylvania courts have applied the same 
principles to stepparents. A.M. v. T.V.,108 for example, involved a dispute 
between the biological father, who had custody, and the biological mother. 
Because the mother had increased her involvement with the child, she op-
posed the custodial claims of a stepparent who had been married to the 
father and taken care of the child during the marriage. The appellate court 
reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the stepmother’s action. It explained 
that the stepparent gained in loco parentis standing based on her assump-
tion of a parental role with the acquiescence of the biological parent; once 
established, the in loco parentis relationship could not be disrupted through 
a change in circumstances, such as the divorce of the stepparent and the 
legal parent. As in Jacob, however, the result was recognition that all three 
adults had standing to seek custodial rights, not that they assumed equal 
standing with each other or that the courts should strive to equalize their 
involvement.
The courts have used similar doctrines to recognize three parents in 
other states. In North Dakota, for example, a stepfather petitioned for cus-
todial rights in a case in which the child’s biological father had visitation 
rights and the mother had primary custody.109 The North Dakota Supreme 
Court upheld the trial court’s finding that the stepparent had assumed a role 
as a “psychological parent,” and that this finding of a psychological parent 
relationship was “an exceptional circumstance” that justified a grant of 
106. Id. at 480–82. In this sense, the court distinguished the basis for the obligations of the former 
partner, who was estopped from denying responsibility for support because of her assertion of custody 
rights from the obligation of the biological father, who the court treated as responsible for support 
irrespective of his assertion of custody claims. 
107. The child separated from the other three had been charged with “indecent assault” against one 
of the other children, and was subject to a court order to stay away from the victim. Id. at 478.
108. 2015 WL 7571451 (Pa. Super. Ct. Feb. 12, 2015).
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visitation, even if it intrudes on the parent’s constitutional rights.110 In con-
trast, a greater intrusion, such as an award of primary custody to the step-
parent, would require a showing of “serious harm or detriment.”111 The 
court emphasized that decision-making authority should remain with the 
biological parent.112 In addition, it expressed concern that the best interests 
of a young child “may not be well served by having him stay in three dif-
ferent homes with three different ‘parents’ each week,” and instructed the 
trial court to consider the child’s stability in determining parenting sched-
ules.113
In New Jersey, the courts have recognized the standing of a “psycho-
logical parent” to seek custodial rights. A court may find that “exceptional 
circumstances” justify such rights if a third party has acted as a parent to 
the child in the home, with the legal parent’s consent, they have developed 
a parent-child bond, and not recognizing the relationship would result in 
the child experiencing serious psychological harm.114 In K.A.F., the birth 
mother’s same-sex partner adopted the child shortly after the child’s birth, 
and continued to be involved in the child’s life after the dissolution of her 
relationship with the birth mother.115 The birth mother entered into a new
partnership. When that relationship dissolved, the partner sought time with 
the children. The adoptive mother objected that she had never consented to 
the birth mother’s spouse’s assumption of a parental role, and therefore that 
the new stepmother did not have standing to seek visitation as a psycholog-
ical parent.116 The New Jersey appellate court concluded that the consent of 
both legal parents was not necessary to standing as a psychological parent 
and remanded the case to the trial court.117
Washington courts have reached similar results, finding that a steppar-
ent may qualify as a third parent pursuant to the de facto parenthood doc-
trine.118 On the other hand, Wyoming rejected recognition of the de facto 
parenthood doctrine entirely because of the difficulties of dealing with such 
110. Id. at 658, 660. 
111. Id. at 660–61.
112. Id. at 661–62.
113. Id. at 661 (internal quotations added).
114. K.A.F. v. D.L.M., 96 A.3d 975, 981-82 (N.J. App. Div. 2014). 
115. Id. at 977.
116. Id. at 978–79.
117. Id. at 982–83.
118. In re Parentage of J.B.R Child, 336 P.3d 648, 654 (Wash. Ct. App. 2014). The Washington 
Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s finding that a stepparent could petition for de facto parentage 
even when the child already has two legal parents. See also Killingbeck v. Killingbeck, 711 N.W.2d 
759, 773–74 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005) (finding that both a divorced husband and the biological father 
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issues.119 The Wyoming Supreme Court pointed to the “practical problems”
involved in determining what rights de facto parents would receive, the 
effect of such rights on the rights of other legal parents, and the lack of any 
objective criteria for the determinations.120 It also noted in particular the 
possibility that more than two adults might receive recognition as par-
ents.121
C. Legislation Recognizing Three Parents
California enacted legislation explicitly authorizing recognition of 
three parents in 2013122 and Maine did so in 2015.123 Because there are no 
cases yet under the Maine statute, this section focuses solely on California. 
The California statute provides that:
[A] court may find that more than two persons with a claim to parentage 
under this division are parents if the court finds that recognizing only 
two parents would be detrimental to the child. In determining detriment 
to the child, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including, but 
not limited to, the harm of removing the child from a stable placement 
with a parent who has fulfilled the child’s physical needs and the child’s
psychological needs for care and affection, and who has assumed that 
role for a substantial period of time.124
The California statute reflects a longstanding state preference for 
recognition of parents on the basis of the assumption of parental responsi-
bilities, rather than biology or formalities on their own.125 The case that 
gave rise to the statute involved circumstances in which a woman con-
ceived a child in heterosexual relationship while she was in a domestic 
partnership with another woman, giving birth after she broke up with the 
father and married her female partner.126 By the time of the dependency 
proceeding, the mother had been arrested for the attempted murder of her 
female partner, the second woman was unable to care for the child, and the 
biological father had moved to another state. California law would ordinari-
119. LP v. LF, 338 P.3d 908, 919–20 (Wyo. 2014).
120. Id. at 919.
121. Id. at 919–20.
122. CAL. FAM. CODE § 7612(c) (West 2016) amended by S.B. 1171, 2016 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 
86 (West).
123. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1853 (2015); see JOSLIN ET AL., supra note 90, at § 7:14 
(“Number of parents”).
124. FAM. § 7612(c).
125. S.B. 274, 2013 Cal. Leg. Sess. (Cal. 2013); see Carbone, From Partners to Parents Revisited,
supra note 27, at 8, 60; see also NeJaime, supra note 27, 1222–30 (discussing California’s historic 
recognition of same-sex partners). 
126. In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856, 862 (2011), superseded by statute, S.B. 274, 2013 
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ly recognize the two female spouses as legal parents, since they had cared 
for the child together immediately after the birth, but under the circum-
stances, without recognition of the biological father as a third parent, the 
child would have been without any parent capable of providing care. Given 
the testimony that the biological father had provided some support and that 
the biological mother had prevented him from establishing a relationship 
with the child, the appellate court recognized the three adults as “presumed 
parents,” and awarded custody to the father based on the weightier consid-
erations of logic and circumstances.127 The statute effectively ratified the 
result, allowing formal recognition of three parents where necessary to 
prevent detriment to the child.128
In subsequent cases, the statute has been used primarily to expand the 
number of people who may be liable for support while basing parentage for 
custody purposes on the child’s existing ties.129 In addressing custody and 
visitation, the California statute provides that:
[I]n cases where a child has more than two parents, the court shall allo-
cate custody and visitation among the parents based on the best interest 
of the child, including, but not limited to, addressing the child’s need for 
continuity and stability by preserving established patterns of care and 
emotional bonds. The court may order that not all parents share legal or 
physical custody of the child if the court finds that it would not be in the 
best interest of the child . . . 130
Thus, in Martinez v. Vaziri,131 the appellate court found that where the 
biological father had abandoned the child during the pregnancy and was 
incarcerated during much of the child’s life, and where the father’s half-
brother had acted as the father after the child’s birth, the trial court had 
impermissibly refused to acknowledge the potential detriment to the child 
from the failure to recognize the uncle as a parent. In effect, recognizing 
the uncle would give the child two functioning parents.
In contrast, the In re Donovan L., Jr. appellate opinion concluded that 
the juvenile court erred in recognizing three parents; in that case, the lower 
court had determined that the mother’s husband, who had lived with the 
mother and child, had been conclusively presumed to be the child’s father, 
127. Id. at 877. The appellate court found that more than two adults met the criteria to be presumed 
parents and thus had a standing to seek custodial rights, but that upon remand, the trial court should 
apply “the weightier considerations of policy and logic” to determine which of the presumed parents to 
recognize as legal parents.  The court thus concluded that while more than two adults had presumed 
parent status and thus standing to participate in the action, the trial court still had to choose among them 
in the award of custody; it could not recognize all three as legal parents. 
128. California Senate Bill 274 § 1. 
129. See analysis of the reported decisions at notes 133–142, infra.
130. Lewis, supra note 23, at 762 (quoting S.B. 274) (alteration in original).
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and the biological father, who claimed recognition as a third parent, lacked 
an existing parent-child relationship.132 The appellate court ruled that in 
these circumstances the biological father was not a legal parent despite his 
established biological relationship to the child. The result in both cases 
effectively created a legal two-parent family, granting legal status to the 
parties who had been in the child’s life since birth. In Martinez, this re-
quired recognizing the uncle as a third parent because the biological fa-
ther’s paternity had already been established in an earlier proceeding.133 In
Donovan, it meant refusing to recognize the biological father.134 In neither 
case, however, did more than two adults have custodial rights in the child, 
nor did the child have an established relationship with three different 
adults. Moreover, in each family, only one parent had primary custody of 
the child.135
More complicated circumstances arose in S.M. v. E.C.136 In that case, 
a partner in a lesbian relationship arranged with a co-worker that he would 
father a child to be raised by the two women.137 The father and the mother, 
however, had an affair and alleged that the child had been conceived before 
the two women used the father’s sperm to inseminate the mother.138 The 
two women separated six months after the child’s birth, and the partner 
sought custodial rights in the dissolution of their domestic partnership.139
The father and mother, who planned to marry, moved in together and the 
father held out the child as his own.140 The appellate court concluded that 
the trial court had correctly ruled that the domestic partner should be rec-
ognized as a parent, but it remanded for a determination of whether the 
biological father should also be recognized as a parent.141 It did not deal 
with the potentially messy issues of balancing custodial rights between the 
almost-married couple and the former domestic partner.
The result in S.M. v. E.C. is not necessarily that different from the ap-
proach taken by the Louisiana courts. Both states clearly recognize intimate 
132. 198 Cal. Rptr. 3d 550, 557 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016). 
133. 200 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 887.
134. 198 Cal. Rpt. 3d 550 at 566. 
135. Id. at 554; Martinez, 200 Cal. Rpt. 3d at 888. 
136. S.M. v. E.C., No. F065817, 2014 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4574 (Cal. Ct. App. June 27, 
2014).
137. Id. at *3.
138. Id. at *2.
139. Id. at *3.
140. Id. at *3–4.
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partners142 as parents and do not allow acknowledgement of a biological 
parent to interfere with the custodial claims of a legal parent who has an 
established relationship with a child. Moreover, in both states, where the 
biological father marries the mother, he will have, at a minimum, steppar-
ent status while the relationship lasts. The unresolved legal question is 
whether, if the marriage to the mother later dissolves, the biological father 
will be able to assert a parental claim to custody in the subsequent divorce 
and, if so, whether the courts will be willing to grant custodial rights to all 
three parents. Without three-parent recognition, stepparents in some states 
can receive visitation as third parties.143 And if, by the time of a later di-
vorce, the non-biological parent no longer has a relationship with the child, 
it would be easy to make a case for stepparent visitation in accordance with 
a best interest analysis.144 In Louisiana, however, even with recognition as 
a parent, the biological father would not have equal standing with the hus-
band to assert custodial rights.145 California courts have yet to address the 
question of how to determine such disputes under the new statute.146
In contrast, states that continue to recognize only two parents must 
choose between the husband and the biological father. In cases like this, 
142. Louisiana’s recognition of functional parents is limited to spouses and no case has arisen 
since the Supreme Court’s decision in Obergefell raising the question of three parent recognition in-
volving same sex-couples. See Spaht, supra note 63, 138–39. California law recognizes partners on 
multiple grounds, but also prefers those with a functional relationship as a parent. See Carbone, From 
Partners to Parents Revisited, supra note 27 at 8. 
143. See, e.g., Gary A. Debele, Family Law Issues for Same-Sex Couples in the Aftermath of 
Minnesota’s Same-Sex Marriage Law: A Family Law Attorney’s Perspective, 41 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 157, 173 (2015) (explaining that “[i]n order to obtain third-party custody rights, the non-legal 
parent must meet the heavy burden of showing, by clear and convincing evidence, parental unfitness, 
harm to the child, abandonment, or some extraordinary need of the child that could not be met by the 
legal parent.”).
144. See, e.g., McAllister v. McAllister, 779 N.W.2d 652, 652 (N.D. 2010) (finding that “evidence 
was sufficient to support finding that stepfather had established his role as child’s psychological parent 
such that he was entitled to third-party visitation rights and parental rights and responsibilities.”). See
also Mahoney, supra note 45, at 85 (noting that third party visitation statutes vary widely in the stand-
ards they apply). 
145. See T.D. v. M.M.M., 730 So. 2d 873, 876 (La. 1999) and discussion at note 60, supra, and 
accompanying text.
146. The California courts have, however, addressed custody matters in cases in which three adults 
have presumed parent status. The In re Jesusa V. court, for example, recognized three parents: Jesusa’s
mother, the mother’s husband Paul, to whom she was married (but separated) at the time of Jesusa’s
conception and birth, and Heriberto, Jesusa’s biological father, who lived with Jesusa and her mother 
after the child’s birth. 85 P.3d 2, 11, 14 (Cal. 2004). The court concluded that all three were presumed 
parents on the basis of various presumptions of California law, and that the court could choose which 
father to recognize on the basis of the weightier circumstances of policy and law. Understandably, the 
court chose Paul, since Heriberto had been arrested for assaulting Jesusa’s mother and faced a deporta-
tion order upon his release from jail. In this case, much like the Louisiana cases, the courts expanded 
the category of adults who had standing to seek custody, but it then chose among the adults; it did not 
give all of them custodial rights at the same time. See Carbone, From Partners to Parents Revisited,
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Utah, for example, has refused to recognize the biological father as a legal 
parent at all, even where he is living with the mother and raising the child 
in an intact marital family.147
D. Summary
While only a few states explicitly recognize three parents through 
statutory language, a growing number embrace the de facto parent doctrine, 
in loco parentis, and similar doctrines that lay the foundation for such 
recognition.148 And almost every marital presumption and stepparent case 
that pits a biological parent against a spouse who has assumed a parental 
function raises similar issues. To date, the three-parent cases are outliers. 
They often involve precedent-setting cases, with courts crafting custom-
tailored remedies to fit particular facts, articulating carefully nuanced justi-
fications for their conclusions, and balancing the needs of the child with 
deference toward the arrangements the parties have worked out for them-
selves.
These cases—although using doctrines such as in loco parentis and
“psychological parent” to recognize more than two parents who have as-
sumed parenting roles—have not accorded three parents equal rights. Nor 
have they made custody determinations in these cases in accordance with 
the same policies that apply to two parents in more typical custody dis-
putes.149 Such policies would assume that it is in the child’s interest to have 
continuing contact with both parents, and to favor an award to the parent 
likely to facilitate the other parent’s continued involvement. Instead, the 
courts have limited their inquiry to the issue of whether the third adult has 
standing to seek any continuing involvement with the child, and the deci-
sions have generally sought to award visitation in circumstances where it 
does not undermine the child’s relationship with the other adults. In addi-
tion, other jurisdictions have refused to extend such doctrines precisely in 
order to avoid the dilution of parental rights that might otherwise occur.
147. See Carbone & Cahn, Marriage, Parentage, and Child Support, supra note 67, at 224–25 
(discussing Pearson v. Pearson, 182 P.3d 353 (2008)).
148. Moreover, an increasing number of states also allow third parties standing to seek visitation, 
without necessarily conferring a parental label on those who qualify under the statutes. These statues 
often apply, however, to adults who have played quasi-parent roles. See, e.g., UNIF. LAW COMM’N,
Preface to NON-PARENTAL CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION ACT, supra note 5, at 13.
149. Indeed, “no state legislature or court has authorized more than three individuals to serve as 
legal parents with full and equal legal rights and obligations.” Yehezkel Margalit et. al., The New 
Frontier of Advanced Reproductive Technology: Reevaluating Modern Legal Parenthood, 37 HARV. J.
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In contrast, the courts that have rejected recognition of these more in-
formal parental statuses express concern less about the particular cases 
before them than about the implications for future cases, such as the appro-
priate hierarchy of rights and the potentially tense relationship between 
multiple parents.150
These concerns about workability apply equally to recognition of mul-
tiple parents. The next section will explain how the custom-crafted results 
in the three-parent cases to date are at odds with the trends in more conven-
tional custody cases, and how the tension between the two poses a chal-
lenge for expanding the recognition of three parents.
III. PARENTAL EQUALITY AND THE PROBLEMS FOR THREE-PARENT
RECOGNITION
Unlike the individually crafted three-parent cases, custody litigation 
has generally moved toward more formulaic and predictable results. In-
deed, the ALI begins its explanation of the Principles with a discussion of 
the tension between “predictability v. individualized decision-making,”151
and acknowledges that expanded recognition of three parents increases 
judicial discretion and requires more individualized decision-making.152
Today, the predominant presumption in custody decision-making is the 
identification of children’s interests with shared parenting and the equal 
standing of fathers and mothers to seek a role in their children’s lives.153
150. In 2014, the Vermont Supreme Court rejected judicial adoption of de facto parentage in a 
divided opinion. The majority observed:
[The] ramifications could be far-reaching. Does recognition of a common law or equitable 
claim for parental contact by unrelated domestic partners include a corresponding right to 
claim child support from an unrelated but putative de facto parent? Can an unrelated but puta-
tive de facto parent then interfere with the biological parent’s decision to move away with his 
or her children? Will every relief-from-abuse proceeding present an avenue for defendant 
partners to counterattack with de facto parentage complaints? 
Moreau v. Sylvester, 95 A.3d 416, 424 n.12 (Vt. 2014).
151. Introductory Materials to Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution: Analysis and Recom-
mendations, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 1 (2001) [hereinafter Introductory Materials].
152. Indeed, the ALI Principles specifically provide that the courts may refuse to recognize par-
ents by estoppel or de facto parents if it would not serve the child’s interests. See discussion supra note 
73. California’s three parent statute similarly conditions recognition as a third parent on a showing that 
a child would otherwise suffer a detriment from the failure to do so. See discussion supra note 118 et. 
seq.  In contrast, where a child would otherwise have only one legal parent, an alleged biological father 
often has standing to establish paternity as a matter of right. See, e.g., Spaht, supra note 63.
153. We have argued elsewhere that as a practical matter, married fathers are substantially more 
likely than unmarried fathers to have shared custody orders, but the law in most states does not distin-
guish between married and unmarried legal parents with respect to either standing to seek custody or 
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These presumptions are at odds with decisions in three-parent cases, and 
the practical realities of family life.154
A. The Shift Toward Shared Parenting
Before the latter part of the eighteenth century, children’s interests 
were presumed to lie with designation of a single parent with unequivocal 
authority.155 At first, that presumption favored fathers.156 In that era, if a 
husband died, an uncle or other male relative with control of the family 
inheritance might be designated as the children’s custodian even where an 
otherwise fit mother had cared for the children from birth.157
By the end of the nineteenth century, that had changed to a best inter-
est test,158 and eventually, a presumption in favor of maternal custody for 
children of tender years that lasted well into the middle of the twentieth 
century.159 With increasing divorce rates in the later part of the twentieth 
century changing the roles of women, an explicitly gender-based presump-
tion came to be viewed as outmoded.160 Some parents proposed joint cus-
tody awards to the courts on their own.161 Initially, the courts resisted.162
154. See, e.g., Baker, Bionormativity, supra note 6, at 708–09. Baker observes that:
To the extent we are willing to accept greater and lesser degrees of parenthood, we need to 
question trends elsewhere in family law that treat all parents as equal. Arguments for joint 
custody, arguments against the labels of “custody” and “visitation” (precisely because they 
suggest a hierarchy), and much of the rhetoric from fathers’ rights groups reject a notion of 
hierarchical parenthood. It is important to recognize, therefore, that a movement to recognize 
more parents-which is almost certainly a movement to recognize different classes of parents-
exists in some tension with movements to equalize parental status.
Id.
155. J. Herbie DiFonzo, From the Rule of One to Shared Parenting: Custody Presumptions in Law 
and Policy, 52 FAM. CT. REV. 213, 214 (2014) (observing that “in virtually all cases, common law 
courts awarded sole custodial rights to the father.”).
156. See id.
157. See MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER’S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN’S RIGHTS; THE HISTORY 
OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (Columbia Univ. Press 1994).
158. See Jamil S. Zainaldin, The Emergence of a Modern American Family Law: Child Custody, 
Adoption, and the Courts, 1796-1851, 73 NW. U. L. REV. 1038, 1052–59 (1979) (describing how the 
common law’s strict paternal entitlement began to give way to discretionary judicial consideration 
of child welfare in early nineteenth century cases).
159. Id.; see also DiFonzo, supra note 155, at 214 (discussing the maternal presumption); 
MARTHA FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALITY: THE RHETORIC AND REALITY OF DIVORCE REFORM
(1991) (describing the maternal presumption as an easy to administer, predictable standard). 
160. DiFonzo, supra note 155, at 215.
161. See JUNE CARBONE, FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS: THE SECOND REVOLUTION IN FAMILY 
LAW 182 (2000).
162. See J. Herbie DiFonzo, Dilemmas of Shared Parenting in the 21st Century: How Law and 
Culture Shape Child Custody, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1003, 1009 (2015) (observing that “Joint custody 
arrangements were nearly incomprehensible to most courts, which felt ‘it [was] hardly possible for a 
child to grow up and live a normal, happy life under such circumstances.”) (quoting Logan v. Logan, 
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Early cases objected that joint custody “divided the control of the child, 
which is to be avoided, whenever possible, as an evil fruitful in the destruc-
tion of discipline, in the creation of distrust, and in the production of mental 
distress in the child.”163 Over time, however, the courts sought to advance 
continued involvement of both parents in the child’s life and, with the dis-
mantling of gendered presumptions, the courts lacked a ready basis to 
choose between two otherwise fit parents.164 The result has become a 
strong preference for shared custody.
Today, all states authorize joint custody awards.165 Some even have 
express preferences or presumptions for joint custody.166 Arkansas not only 
favors joint custody, but also defines it as “the approximate and reasonable 
equal division of time with the child by both parents individually as agreed 
to by the parents or as ordered by the court.”167 Other states do not neces-
sarily have presumptions in favor of either joint custody or equal division, 
but most states, as a matter of policy, identify children’s interests with fre-
quent and continuing contact with both parties.168 In addition, many states 
favor the award of custody to the parent who is most likely to promote the 
continuing involvement of the other parent.169
The result of these provisions is a strong preference for shared custody 
awards. A family law report concluded in 2014 that “[t]he most significant 
trend in contemporary child custody law is toward greater active involve-
ment by both parents in postseparation childrearing.”170 Though the courts 
continue to express concern about parents who cannot cooperate sufficient-
ly to manage joint custody, studies show that from the earliest days of joint 
163. McCann v. McCann, 173 A. 7, 9 (Md. 1934).
164. DiFonzo, supra note 162, at 215; see Dinner, supra note 14, at 115–16. 
165. As of 2012, forty-seven states and the District of Columbia have statutes authoriz-
ing joint legal and/or physical custody. Dorothy R. Fait et al., The Merits and Problems with Presump-
tions for Joint Custody, 45 MD. BAR J. 12, 14 (Feb. 2012). The three that lack express legislation 
authorize joint custody awards through case law; DiFonzo, supra note 162 at 217.
166. DiFonzo, supra note 162, at 217.
167. S.B. 901, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2013) (amending ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-
101(a))(emphasis added). The new legislation also provided that “custody shall be awarded in such a 
way so as to assure the frequent and continuing contact of the child with both parents” consistent with 
the child’s best interest, including the provision favoring an award of joint custody. Id.
168. DiFonzo, supra note 162, at 216 (observing that “[a]s a matter of public policy, the phrase 
‘frequent and continuing contact with both parents’ appears in most state statutes with nearly mechani-
cal regularity.”). 
169. Id. at 225 (stating that “[t]o promote active participation by both parents after separation, 
many states have amended their best interest factors to include “friendly parent” provisions . . . The 
rationale is straightforward: children are thought to do better when both parents continue to raise them; 
thus, if one parent will not allow the other to play that critical role and the other will, the ““friendly 
parent” should have an advantage in the custody battle.”).
170. Marsha Kline Pruett & J. Herbie DiFonzo, Closing the Gap: Research, Policy, Practice and 
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custody, the courts often impose such solutions when the parties cannot 
voluntarily reach agreement.171Indeed, a recent Maryland case upheld a 
joint legal and physical custody agreement even after concluding that the 
parents could not stand each other or manage a cooperative relationship.172
The appellate court ruled that, despite long-standing Maryland precedent
emphasizing that “[r]arely, if ever, should joint legal custody be awarded 
in the absence of a record of mature conduct on the part of the parents 
evidencing an ability to effectively communicate with each other.”173 The 
trial court had structured the award to advance the children’s interest in a 
continuing relationship with both parents.174
These cases reflect a long-term shift in custody decision-making. 
Parenthood has historically been “an exclusive, all-or-nothing status.”175
Not only did this mean that a child could have only one mother and one 
father, but once an adult received recognition as a legal parent, the courts 
enforced their right to equal decision-making authority with respect to the 
child’s life.176 As a practical matter, this has come to mean: 1) a right to 
develop a relationship with the child, even if that parent had not consistent-
ly assumed responsibility for the child;177 and 2) the corresponding threat 
that courts will deny custody to a parent who refuses to support the in-
volvement of the other parent, even if the two adults do not respect each 
other and have little ability to cooperate.178 In accordance with such pre-
cepts, the Wyoming Supreme Court upheld a trial court’s transfer of custo-
dy of eight- and nine-year-old children from the mother to the father 
because of the mother’s “reluctance to foster a positive relationship be-
tween Father and the children by openly disparaging Father to the chil-
dren.”179
171. ELEANOR MACCOBY & ROBERT MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL 
DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 149–53 (Harvard Univ. Press 1992).
172. Santo v. Santo, No. 0061, 2015 WL 5921468, at *1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. Oct. 9, 2015), aff’d,
141 A.3d 74 (Md. 2016).
173. Id. at *4 (quoting another opinion).
174. Id. (emphasis in original).
175. Introductory Materials, supra note 151, at 5 (2001).
176. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 60 (2000); MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 171, at 106–
08 (observing that even in the early days of joint custody, joint legal custody was available for the 
asking). 
177. Courtney v. M. Roggy, 302 S.W.3d 141, 149 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009).
178. In re Miller, 20 A.3d 854, 862 (N.H. 2011) (observing that “[a]cross the country, the great 
weight of authority holds that conduct by one parent that tends to alienate the child’s affections from the 
other is so inimical to the child’s welfare s to be grounds for a denial of custody to, or a change of 
custody from, the parent guilty of such conduct.”) (quoting Renaud v. Renaud, 721 A.2d 463, 465–66
(1998)).
179. JR v. TLW, 371 P.3d 570, 577 (Wyo. 2016). The court did so despite the fact that the mother 
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excluded the other parent from a major say in the child’s life.185 Recogniz-
ing two parties with comparable authority in the child’s life increased the 
need for judicial intervention to manage disputes.186 Critics like Baker ar-
gue that increasing the number of parents beyond two magnifies the ef-
fect.187
The second concern is that managing more than two parents effective-
ly makes formal equality among them challenging, if not impossible. The 
concern is not just that the third adult will occupy a lesser position, but that 
recognition of the third parent will alter the relationship between the first 
two. Baker acknowledged almost a decade ago that “[t]o the extent we are 
willing to accept greater and lesser degrees of parenthood, we need to ques-
tion trends elsewhere in family law that treat all parents as equal,” and 
thus reject a notion of hierarchical parenthood. Baker then states it is im-
portant to recognize that “a movement to recognize more parents—which is 
almost certainly a movement to recognize different classes of parents—
exists in some tension with movements to equalize parental status.”188
None of the cases discussed above that recognize more than two par-
ents assign equal rights concerning decision-making authority, nor do they 
grant equal amounts of custodial time following dissolution of the parental 
relationship. In some cases, the recognition of the third adult results in a 
sole custody award to that adult; this was the motive for the California case 
that provided initial recognition of three parents.189 In the cases that come 
closest to an equal allocation of time, two of the parents may be living to-
gether in an intact relationship.190 Where three or more parents live apart, 
however, and all want some relationship to the child, the courts have to 
manage the complex relationships that arise. As a practical matter, these 
cases do not accord equal rights: instead, as Baker suggests, they adopt a 
hierarchy of relationships, sometimes based on the law, and sometimes 
based on the strength of the child’s bond with the various adults.191 In that 
185. Appleton, Numbers, supra note 6, at 43–44.
186. Id.
187. Baker, Bionormativity, supra note 6, at 675.
188. Baker, Bionormativity, supra note 6, at 708–09.
189. See In re M.C., 123 Cal. Rptr. 3d 856, 887 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) superseded by statute, S.B.
274, 2013 Cal. Leg. Sess. § 1 (Cal. 2013).
190. See, e.g., S.M. v. E.C., No. F065817, 2014 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 4574, at *31–32 (Ct. 
App. June 27, 2014) (recognizing same-sex couple as parents, but remanding for consideration of 
whether biological father, who had an affair with the biological mother and who later planned to marry 
her, should also receive recognition as a parent).  
191. See, e.g., Geen v. Geen, 666 So. 2d 1192, 1193–94 (La. App. 1995), writ denied, 669 So. 2d 
1224 (La. 1996) (granting joint legal custody to all three parents, but recognizing only the husband as 
“domiciliary parent,” which typically would involve greater deference to his judgment in the event of a 
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hierarchy, one parent becomes a primary parent while the others receive 
visitation.192 Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob provides a model: the court awarded 
primary custody to a single parent, and then provided for the other two to 
receive time, but not equal decision-making capacity.193
The third ground for hesitation is that the courts, in exercising the dis-
cretion necessary to make these arrangements work, will decide on the 
basis of stereotypically gendered (or other biased) presumptions. Oppo-
nents of alternative families tend to emphasize the need for a single father 
and a single mother.194 Yet, as Susan Appleton speculates, courts will be 
particularly eager to recognize a third parent where that parent adds a par-
ent of the opposite sex.195 In other cases, the addition of a third parent 
might serve to penalize the mother who had intimate relations with more 
than one partner, or who seeks to end an abusive or otherwise unsatisfacto-
ry relationship.196
We agree that these concerns underlie judicial decision-making about 
custody matters. Nevertheless, it is not clear that recognition of three par-
ents is necessarily worse than cases limiting recognition to two parents. 
Consider a recent New York case in which a woman, married to another 
woman, conceived a child while she was separated from her spouse.197 The 
two spouses later reconciled and raised the child together. The biological 
father wanted recognition as a father.198 The New York intermediate-level 
court, addressing the issue of whether the marital presumption applied, 
decided that it did not, in large part because the effect would be to deprive 
the child of a father.199 Given a choice of which two parents to recognize, 
the court chose the biological mother and father.200 Although not part of the 
192. Geen, 660 So. 2d at 1193–94.
193. Jacob, 923 A.2d at 476. 
194. See, e.g., Elizabeth Marquardt, Op-Ed, When 3 Really Is a Crowd, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2007, 
at A13 (“[N]o court should break open the rule of two when assigning legal parenthood.”).
195. She observes that “I see as no coincidence the court’s recognition of parental status for the 
sperm donor in Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob because, without such recognition, the children would have two 
mothers but no father” and speculates whether the courts would have been as eager to do so if the third 
parent had been another woman. See also Appleton, Numbers, supra note 6, at 53–54. This echoes the 
paradigmatic claim by Nancy Polikoff when it came to recognition of two same-sex parents concerning
the need for a parent of each gender: “The law operates to require that a child have one parent of each 
sex.” Polikoff, supra note 100, at 468.
196. Indeed, some scholars have opposed recognition of de facto parents for similar reasons. See,
e.g., Robin Fretwell Wilson, Limiting the Prerogatives of Legal Parents: Judicial Skepticism of the 
American Law Institute’s Treatment of De Facto Parents, 25 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAW 477, 484 
(2013) (arguing that “the ALI’s thinned-out test for parenthood overrides the judgments of mothers.”).
197. Q.M. v. B.C., 995 N.Y.S.2d 470, 472 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2014).
198. Id. at 471.
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opinion, the law that would ordinarily apply in such circumstances would 
then presume that the child’s interest were best served by the continuing 
involvement of both parents, even if the mother and father had little to no 
relationship with each other, and could not effectively communicate or 
work cooperatively with each other.201 Recognition of three parents desta-
bilizes this two equal parent dynamic on three grounds. It requires the court 
to consider the best interest of the child without applying a cookie cutter 
presumption that the child’s interests necessarily lie with maximizing the 
involvement of all three parents, given the practical difficulties of doing 
so.202 It effectively rules out the pretense that all three parents stand on 
equal terms to each other or the child. And it makes it harder for courts to 
do what the New York judge did, and recognize the biological father to the
exclusion of the same-sex spouse.203 We believe that all three results are 
advantages, not disadvantages, of three-parent recognition, and that such 
results, which mirror the results in the cases recognizing three parents to 
date, provide guidance for what the emerging law of parentage should do. 
We take up these principles in the next section.
IV. THE EMERGING LAW OF MULTIPLE PARENTAGE
In looking toward a future that assumes the existence of multiple 
parenthood, successful doctrinal development depends on dealing with the 
issues of how to allocate rights and responsibilities. Doing so requires rec-
onciling the law that governs recognition of third parents with that govern-
ing more conventional two parent relationships. Central to those issues is 
the idea of parental equality. When, if ever, is equality appropriate for any 
parents?
A. The Prerequisites for Parental Equality
As we noted above, the idea of parental equality is new. Historically, 
women were viewed as subordinate to men,204 and the law either recog-
201. See, e.g., Santo v. Santo, 141 A.3d 74, 76 (Md. 2016) (upholding joint custody award even 
where parents had little ability to communicate or cooperate with each other).
202. Moreover, in some cases, this leads to rejection of a third parent, eliminating the need to 
balance the respective roles of the three. See, e.g., In re Donovan L., Jr., 198 Cal. Rptr. 3d 550, 557, 565 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2016) (concluding that the juvenile court erred in recognizing three parents, given its 
determination that the mother’s husband, who had lived with mother and child, had been conclusively 
presumed to be the child’s father and the biological father, who claimed recognition as a third parent, 
lacked an existing parent-child relationship).
203. It may also make it harder to exclude the biological father in jurisdictions that would other-
wise uphold application of the marital presumption in the case of two same-sex parents. 
204. William Kristol, Women’s Liberation: The Relevance of Tocqueville, in INTERPRETING 
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nized the father as head of household within intact marriages, or divorced 
mothers as primary caretakers and legal custodians for young children fol-
lowing divorce.205 Hierarchy, not equality, determined these relationships. 
Today, in contrast, equality is an important quality in committed relation-
ships. As we have argued elsewhere, marriage—and the divisions at di-
vorce—has been remade as a relationship among equals.206 That is, the law 
presumes that married couples engage in equivalent exchanges and share 
equally in the assumption of rights and responsibilities with respect to their 
children.207 Couples who do not want an equal relationship or do not see 
their current partners as capable of such an exchange, or worthy of the 
commitment involved in making it work, do not marry.208 This shift in the 
nature of marriage both reflects and reinforces the application of sharing 
principles at divorce; couples understand that marriage involves a commit-
ment to inclusion of the other spouse in their children’s lives, even if the 
marriage does not endure.209
Custody awards reflect these changes—as fathers have become much 
more likely to receive shared custody awards at divorce—while unmarried 
mothers remain dramatically more likely to have sole custody awards even 
when the father remains in contact with the children.210 While custody law 
does not necessarily distinguish among parents on the basis of marriage, 
practical considerations make equal parental status more realistic at divorce 
than in other circumstances.211 This is true because married couples have 
made a commitment to each other, have typically cared for the child in a 
joint household, have established relationships with each other and the 
child at the time of the dissolution of their relationship, and have (or should 
have) an expectation that they need to continue to include the other parent 
in the child’s life following dissolution.
The reported cases in which three or more parents are involved in a 
child’s life rarely involve an explicit agreement to assume equal responsi-
who were unlikely to come to these conclusions on their own, must be taught, “to grasp the following
three points: the necessity of marriage, the importance of good morals, and the necessity of inequality 
within marriage.”)
205. See generally Carbone & Cahn, Nonmarriage, supra note 10.
206. JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS III (Oxford Univ. Press 2014).
207. Id.; see also Carbone & Cahn, Nonmarriage, supra note 10.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. See June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, The Triple System of Family Law, 2013 MICH. ST. L. REV.
1185, 1224–25; see also BROWN & COOK, supra note 51, at 28–29.
211. See Carbone & Cahn, The Triple System of Family Law, supra note 210, at 1226; see also
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bility for the child.212 That is, where there is the possibility of three or more 
parents, they are unlikely: 1) to have made a commitment to each other to 
include all of the adults in the child’s life on a permanent basis; 2) to have 
lived together in a single residence; 3) to have bonds to the child that are 
equally strong or equally important to the child’s well-being; and 4) to be 
able to cooperate as a threesome in reaching agreement on the child’s
needs. Indeed, it well may be that the more adults involved, the greater 
likelihood of disagreement.213 It is worth considering where, if ever, equali-
ty may be possible among more than two parents. We think it may be pos-
sible in two types of cases.
The first involves a lesbian couple and a sperm donor—or a gay male 
couple and a gestational carrier (or possibly an egg donor)—who agree to 
assume shared responsibility of the child at birth, and do so for a period of 
at least two years after the child’s birth. We can imagine couples reaching 
such agreements, and we imagine determined parents working out such 
arrangements.
On the other hand, many same-sex couples do not want a third party to 
have equal status, precisely because of the fear that the third party will 
intrude on the primary couple’s decision-making authority if they later 
disagree.214 Martha Ertman, for example, has developed a model co-
parenting agreement to deal explicitly with such circumstances; the first 
article of that agreement provides that one parent will have “primary physi-
cal and legal” custody.215 Moreover, even same-sex couples who want to 
involve a third party in rearing a child on equal terms do not typically do so 
on a truly equal basis because of the difficulties of coordinating such activi-
ties in separate households.216 Nonetheless, we could imagine three or more 
adults not only agreeing to, but also following up on such an agreement, 
and we would leave room open to such a possibility if the parties explicitly 
agree.
The second example involves polygamy. Again, we can imagine cir-
cumstances where three or more parents agree to create a family that in-
212. But see LaChappelle v. Mitten, 607 N.W.2d 151, 157 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000) (involving an 
agreement that the biological mother and her same-sex partner have physical and legal custody of the 
child while the sperm donor and his partner “would be entitled to a significant relationship.”) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
213. See generally Baker, Bionmarativity, supra note 6.
214. For the classic example, see generally Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (N.Y. 1993). 
215. ERTMAN, supra note 89, at 199. See also LaChappelle, 607 N.W.2d at 157. 
216. For a discussion of the different expectations concerning the involvement of known donors, 
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ther has continued to play a substantial role in the child’s life—or the 
mother and her new partner—if the stepparent has replaced the other bio-
logical parent in the child’s life with the encouragement of the child’s cus-
todial parent.
Historically, adoption has served as a bright-line rule distinguishing 
between stepparents who: (1) assume a full parental role equal to that of the 
biological parent; and (2) those who play a secondary role.221 The ALI 
Principles, while according parental recognition both to stepparents who 
adopt and to those who do not, recommend use of adoption to clarify the 
different types of roles.222 We agree that stepparent adoption offers a way 
to establish two (and only two) equal parents, and that, in the cases that 
recognize two biological parents plus a stepparent as three parents entitled 
to at least some legal recognition, the courts will have to distinguish among 
the differing responsibilities of each of the various parental roles on a case-
by-case basis.
We expect the norm in such cases extending recognition to three 
adults to be hierarchical, rather than equal, relationships.223 Accordingly, 
we suggest the following approach for when the courts recognize more than 
two adults as having standing to seek custody and visitation:
1. There should be a presumption that the child’s best interest lies 
in the strength of the relationship with a primary parent, and that 
other parents should receive physical custodial awards only to 
the extent that they do not undermine the relationship with the 
primary parent.
221. See Mahoney, supra note 45, at 85–86.
222. The ALI provides that parents by estoppel should be recognized as parents equal to other 
legal parents. The Principles nonetheless recommend that: 
Adoption is the clearer, and thus preferred, legal avenue for recognition of such parent-child 
relationships, but adoption is sometimes not legally available or possible, especially if the one 
of the adults is still married to another . . . [N]either the unavailability of adoption nor the 
failure to adopt when adoption would have been available forecloses parent-by-estoppel sta-
tus. However, the failure to adopt when adoption was available may be relevant to whether an 
agreement was intended.
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, § 2.03(1)(b) cmt. a, illus. 8(iii).
With respect to de facto parentage, the Principles similarly provide that:
As is the case with an individual seeking to be a parent by estoppel under Paragraph (1)(b)(iii) or Para-
graph (1)(b)(iv), the best course of action for an individual who expects legal recognition as a de facto 
parent would be formal adoption, if available under applicable state law. Failure to adopt the child when 
it would have been possible is some evidence, although not dispositive, that the legal parent did not 
agree to the formation of the de facto parent relationship. 
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, § 2.03 cmt. c.
223. We use the term “hierarchical” here in the same sense as Baker. See Baker, Bionormativity,
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2. There should be a presumption that the child’s best interest lies 
with the allocation of decision-making authority over the child’s
life in a single adult, unless the court adopts a parenting plan that 
allocates decision-making responsibility for particular issues 
(e.g., music lessons) to an alternative parent or parents, and justi-
fies the reason for the decision in writing.
These presumptions can be rebutted only where three or more adults 
have agreed to assumption of equal rights and responsibilities for a child at 
the child’s birth, and have in fact assumed comparable responsibility for 
the child for at least two years after the child’s birth.224 In accordance with 
the approach taken by the ALI, this allows courts discretion not to recog-
nize a third adult as a fully equal parent where the result would be too 
complicated to administer and would not advance the child’s interests.225
Outside of those relationships where two parents explicitly agree to, 
and implement, a joint assumption of rights and responsibilities, most par-
ents—whether there are one, two or three—neither spend equal amounts of 
time with their children, nor assume equal responsibility for their well-
being. For the last decade, scholars have pointed out that recognition of 
multiple parents is closely related to the move away from formal, exclu-
sive, binary parental relationships, and toward acceptance of varied func-
tional parenting roles.226
We believe that consideration of three or more parents should lead to 
greater differentiation between those families where the parents (most typi-
cally two) have a genuinely shared assumption of responsibility for the 
child and the many other families where a primary parent takes on the prin-
cipal caretaking functions with assistance from others. Marriage, as we 
have argued elsewhere, has come to mean an agreement, not only to share 
caretaking for the children who result, but also to assume a responsibility to 
224. The ALI requires that for recognition as a parent equal to other legal parents that the third 
adult has:
(iii) lived with the child since the child’s birth, holding out and accepting full and permanent 
responsibilities as parent, as part of a prior co-parenting agreement with the child’s legal par-
ent (or, if there are two legal parents, both parents) to raise a child together each with full pa-
rental rights and responsibilities, when the court finds that recognition of the individual as a 
parent is in the child’s best interests; or (iv) lived with the child for at least two years, holding 
out and accepting full and permanent responsibilities as a parent, pursuant to an agreement 
with the child’s parent (or, if there are two legal parents, both parents), when the court finds 
that recognition of the individual as a parent is in the child’s best interests . . . .
ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 4, § 2.03(b)(iii)–(iv).
225. It would leave open, of course, the possibility of recognizing a third adult, such as stepparent, 
through de facto parentage provisions that do not treat the third adult as a parent with equal standing to 
the first two or through third party visitation statutes.
226. See, e.g., Jacobs, Parental Parity, supra note 6, at 470; Jacobs, Why Just Two?, supra note 1,
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support the other parent’s continuing involvement with the child.227 Parents 
may assume different roles while the marriage lasts, but at divorce, the 
expectation of equal parental status has justified a presumption in favor of 
shared parenting.228 While we do not believe this is justified in every case, 
given that one parent typically takes on more caretaking responsibilities 
than the other, at least there is an explicit “opting into” a relationship that 
presumes equality. In contrast, couples that have a child together and do 
not marry often do not, precisely because they do not see the second parent 
as contributing in equal or reliable ways. These parents often go on to form 
additional relationships with other partners, who may or may not play sub-
stantial roles in the lives of their children. As the law recognizes multiple 
parenting roles, it should move away from a rigid insistence on parental 
equality to greater differentiation between equal and unequal parental rela-
tionships.
B. Custodial Principles
1. Equal Parental Rights and Responsibilities
We started with the presumption that recognition of three equal par-
ents will be rare. In applying the principles, we begin by imaging the cir-
cumstances in which three parents might equally share custody after 
dissolution. One case is easy: we have no objection to an order of shared 
custody among three parents if all three agree to such an order. In such a 
case, we could imagine three parents with shared legal and physical custo-
dy and support obligations, in accordance with a parenting plan to which 
the parties agreed. The second case where we believe equally shared custo-
dy and financial obligations would be appropriate is where there are two 
households (not three) and the three parents have the ability to cooperate. 
Imagine a case not so different from the Geen case. In that case, the mother 
conceived a child with one man, was married to and cared for the child 
with a second man (her “husband”), divorced the husband, and then later 
married the biological father.229 Assume that the mother and the husband 
have shared custody at the time of the divorce, and that the biological fa-
ther asserts paternity only after he and the mother marry. In this case, as a 
practical matter, the biological father will be living with the mother and the 
child, and he will share in whatever custodial rights the mother has. We see 
227. See generally CARBONE & CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS, supra note 206.
228. See gnerally Carbone & Cahn, Nonmarriage, supra note 10 (exploring these concepts). 
229. 666 So. 2d 1192, 1193 (La. App. 1995), writ denied, 669 So. 2d 1224 (La. 1996) (discussed 
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no problem in recognizing both the husband and the biological father as 
parents, and having the three parents assume shared custody and financial 
obligations in accordance with the original divorce decree. Such an ar-
rangement, however, should not be seen as necessarily creating a presump-
tion that the three would share custody equally upon a second divorce, 
creating three households. Were such an additional divorce to occur, the 
court would have to make a new determination about whether the three 
parents were able to cooperate in a way that made truly shared parenting 
among the three possible.
2. Unequal Parental Standing
In most other cases, equal parental standing is unwarranted. Although 
there are numerous potential situations in which multiple parents might be 
accorded recognition, their respective rights should depend on the various 
relationships among the parents, as well as between the parents and the 
child. Rather than trying to prescribe outcomes in each context, we focus 
on the facts underlying the Supreme Court decision in Michael H.230 As we 
have argued elsewhere, we would reach quite different decisions based on 
the timing of the litigation.231
In that case, the mother, Carole, was married to Gerald.232 She had an 
affair with Michael that produced a child, Victoria.233 After Victoria’s
birth, the three spent three months together in the Bahamas. Michael visited 
Carole and Victoria whenever he was in Southern California, and Victoria 
called Michael “Daddy.”234 Shortly before Victoria turned three, however, 
Carole cut off all contact with Michael, and she and Gerald eventually 
moved to New York and had two additional children.235 The Supreme 
Court, in a plurality opinion, upheld the constitutionality of the marital 
presumption.236 By permitting—but not requiring—use of the marital pre-
sumption, the Court has left parentage determinations to states’ discretion.
Consider now what would happen if, at the time Michael originally
filed the action, Gerald had filed for divorce. That is, shortly after Carole 
230. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 113 (1989).
231. Although the decision was appropriate at the time the Supreme Court decided the case, five 
years after it was initiated, that was not necessarily the appropriate outcome at the time of the initial 
trial court decision. June Carbone & Naomi Cahn, Which Ties Bind? Redefining the Parent-Child 
Relationship in an Age of Genetic Certainty, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1011, 1044–45 (2003).
232. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 113. 
233. Id.
234. Id. at 136, 144 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
235. Id. at 115.
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cut off Michael’s contact with Victoria when she was three, Gerald filed for 
divorce. Assuming that all three had an established relationship with Victo-
ria, and all three sought custody,237 the guiding principles would recognize 
all three as parents, but a custody award would recognize only one primary 
parent. Managing the involvement of adults in three separate households 
would be difficult. Carole would have been the one constant in Victoria’s
life, and only Carole had any kind of relationship with both men. Accord-
ingly, it would make sense to make Carole the primary custodian (assum-
ing that she was otherwise a fit parent), and award the two men some time 
with the child and some financial obligation for her.238
Contrast this outcome with litigation occurring at the time of the Su-
preme Court’s decision in the case.239 By then, five years had passed, Mi-
chael had no contact with Victoria in the interim, Carole and Gerald had 
moved to New York, and remained married and had additional children.240
At this point, recognizing Michael as a parent with a right to custody would 
be disruptive. Carole and Gerald had a unitary household, in which they 
enjoyed equal parental status with respect to each other, in a different state, 
and both opposed Michael’s involvement. Michael had no ongoing rela-
tionship with Victoria.241 Treating Michael as a legal parent would, absent 
additional facts not present in the case, not be in Victoria’s interests. At 
most, therefore, we would treat Michael as a third party, who could seek 
visitation only upon a substantial showing that it served Victoria’s inter-
ests.242
The most difficult circumstances involve the facts at the time Michael 
filed the initial case. At that point, Gerald would have parental status on the 
basis of the marital presumption and his assumption of parental responsibil-
ities during the marriage. Michael would also have parental standing on the 
bases of biological paternity and his assumption of a relationship with Vic-
toria that included at least some provision of support, several months of co-
237. The case provides little information about Gerald’s relationship with Victoria at that point, 
but Gerald’s name was on the birth certificate, he and Carole stayed married, and they went on to have 
additional children, so we assume that he played a paternal role.
238. This result would be similar to the trial court order in LaChappelle v. Mitten, which awarded 
the birth mother primary custody, and the biological father and the birth mother’s partner visitation. 607 
N.W.2d 151 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000). 
239. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 113.
240. Id. at 115.
241. Id. at 116 (lower courts denied Michael’s petition, supported by Victoria, for visitation).
242. Justice Stevens wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment in Michael H. that endorsed such 
a result, but in fact, California law at the time did not recognize third party standing to seek visitation. 
Many more states have third party visitation provisions today, but most still place a substantial burden 
on the third party who wished visitation over the objection of the legal parent or parents. See Debele, 
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residence, and an emotional bond with the child.243 Both men, and Carole, 
appear to have had a parental bond with Victoria. In these circumstances, 
we would, subject to an in-depth consideration of Victoria’s best interest, 
recognize all three as parents and, assuming Carole and Gerald remained 
together, award primary physical and legal custody to them with visitation 
to Michael. The award of primary custody to Carole and Gerald jointly 
would not necessarily create a presumption about allocation of custodial 
rights should they later divorce; that would depend on the respective roles 
of the three adults, and their ability to cooperate at the later time. Moreo-
ver, in these circumstances, where Carole and Gerald did not both consent 
to Michael’s role, Michael’s visitation should be subject to a determination 
that would not undermine Victoria’s relationship with Carole and with the 
family Carole and Gerald have created together. In this sense, while we 
would recognize Michael as Victoria’s father, we would treat him legally 
as a third party whose ability to receive visitation is dependent on a best 
interest analysis that starts with a presumption that Victoria’s interests lie in 
the strength of her relationship with her primary custodians rather than with 
all parents equally.
In all of the scenarios in which the courts recognize three parents who 
live in separate households, the primary parent’s wishes should receive 
deference in the determination of parenting schedules. Such schedules 
should allot enough time with the primary parent to insure an adequate 
relationship, even if the net result is that the relationships with the other 
parents is not as strong because of the lack of more consistent or sufficient 
parenting time. In the event of conflict among the parents, it further re-
quires deference to the primary parent, even where that parent’s decisions 
may not be sufficiently respectful of the interests of the other parents. As a 
practical matter, therefore, we see the possibility that the recognition of 
three parents may be fundamentally at odds with the principles that apply 
to two, presumptively equal adults who have parented together in the con-
text of an intact relationship, and who can realistically share responsibility 
for a child after dissolution of their family circumstances.
243. Some states would still use the marital presumption to block recognition of Michael if he 
waited until Victoria turned three to establish paternity. Other states, however, would allow Michael to 
establish paternity. See Carbone & Cahn, Marriage, Parentage, and Child Support, supra note 67, at 
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C. Child Support
Recognition of multiple parents has been recommended as a way to 
expand the number of parties who could be held liable for child support.244
Yet, it seems unfair to hold a parent liable for support where that parent has 
had a limited role in the child’s life, particularly where there is an agree-
ment with the other parents that the limited parent would not be responsible 
for support.245 At the same time, the ALI’s de facto parentage provisions, 
which provide custodial rights to functional parents who have no support 
obligation, have also been questioned for according privileges without fi-
nancial responsibilities.246
We believe that for multiple parent recognition to work, there should 
be a reconfiguration of the relationship among custodial rights, financial 
obligations, and the ability to pay. Where three or more parents have never 
assumed equal responsibility for the child, their financial obligations 
should also not be presumed equal or calculated in the same manner as 
classic two-parent obligations that assume an equal assumption of respon-
sibility for the child. Instead, the financial obligations should reflect a com-
bination of custodial time and ability to pay. Fully developing what 
“unequal” parenthood means is a project that will unfold in the courts—and 
in families.
V. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, recognition of three parents can provide stability and con-
tinuity for a child’s relationship with relevant adults.247 As courts decide 
actual disputes among potential parents, they are implementing the three-
parent doctrine in a manner that accords primary parenting rights to one 
adult rather than granting shared decision-making rights to multiple adults. 
As they understand, one parent typically has consistently provided care and 
stability for the child, and it is that parent who should be given more rights. 
Yet, a presumption of unequal roles, like other custody presumptions, 
244. Jacobs, More Parents, More Money, supra note 6, at 220. 
245. E.g., Sperm Donor May be Responsible for Child Support, Medical Expenses, KFOR-TV 
(Dec. 3, 2015, 11:49 AM), http://kfor.com/2015/12/03/sperm-donor-may-be-responsible-for-child-
support-medical-expenses/.
246. See, e.g., KATHARINE K. BAKER, Asymmetric Parenthood, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY:
CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE’S PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION
121–128 (Robin F. Wilson ed. 2006).
247. See Nancy D. Polikoff, From Third Parties to Parents: The Case of Lesbian Couples and 
Their Children, 77 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 195, 220 (2014) (arguing for the need to move beyond 
biology in recognizing parents: “The importance of stability and continuity is precisely the principle 
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should be rebuttable, leaving open the possibility of treating all three par-
ents on equal terms where the three agree, or where the three have been 
involved on an equal basis since the child’s birth and an allocation of rights 
and responsibilities is workable.
The multiple parent model is a good idea only so long as it is applied 
to recognize the realities of multiple types of families and the need to ac-
cord differing—and unequal—rights to those deemed to be “parents.”
